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ABSTRACT
This thesis tests the proposition that a bipolar dis
tribution of power is more stable than a multipolar distri
bution.
It does this by examining the dynamics of GermanSoviet relations during two historical periods:
one m ulti
polar, from 1917 to 1939, and one bipolar from 1948 to 1973.
The thesis concludes that three examples of German-Soviet
cooperation during the multipolar period— the Treaty of BrestLitovsk, the Rapallo Treaty, and the Molotov-von Rippentrop
Pact— demonstrate that the freedom of movement afforded by a
diffuse distribution of power can lead to miscalculation,
miscommunication and unintended consequences. Alternatively,
efforts in German-Soviet relations during a bipolar period to
resolve issues arising from the division of Europe— such as
the Stalin Note of 1952, the Second Berlin Crisis 1958-1961,
and Willy Brandt*s Ostpolitik 1969-1973— demonstrate the
tendency within a tight bipolar system to solidify and
reaffirm the established balance of power.

GERMAN-SOVIET RELATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

INTRODUCTION
In 1989 the German Democratic Republic broke open the
Berlin Wall.

The following year, the Soviet Union approved

the reunification of Germany as a member of the North A t l a n 
tic Treaty Organization.

By the end of 1991, the Soviet

Union had dissolved into fifteen separate states and the
Communist Party had relinquished official permanent govern
ing status in each of the former member countries of the
Warsaw Pact.

These events occurred with amazingly little

bloodshed and with surprisingly little enthusiasm by the
Soviet bloc's supposedly mortal enemies in NATO.
Only three years prior to these events, Anton DePorte
republished his thought-provoking,
1977 essay.

but eminently reasonable,

In it he maintained that the division of Europe

was so stable,

and so much in the interest of those with the

power to change it, that it would likely last into the next
century.

DePorte based his thesis on three points.

The

first was the decline and death of the classical European
state system.
system,

The second was the transformation of the

as a result of the Cold War,

that was essentially extra-European,

into a bipolar system,
in that the two poles

were the Soviet Union and the United States.

2

The third was

3
that by 1977 this system was likely to continue as a power
relationship independent of a continuance of the Cold War.1
DePorte acknowledged the value of the classical Europe
an state system, which has been credited with assuring the
continued existence of the major states for over four
centuries through the constant shifting of alliances, which
prevented the balance of power from moving permanently in
favor of any one state or coalition.2
system failed,

of course.

In the end, the

DePorte argued that it was unable

to contain the power of Germany after its unification in
1871,

and German power finally had to be subdued in World

War II by the United States and the Soviet Union.3

The

post-1945 system, roughly symmetrical with the United States
and the Soviet Union as poles,
Germany between the two camps.

rested on the division of
This division of Germany,

and the division of Europe,

as a consequence,

satisfied the

^.W.
DePorte,
Europe
Enduring Balance (New Haven:
ix.

between the Supe r p o w e r s :
The
Yale University Press, 1986), p.

2DePorte fixes the start of the balance of power system
to 1494, when Charles VIII of France invaded Italy.
In
response,
Spain and the Holy Roman Empire also became
involved.
Ibid., p. 2.
3DePorte credits Alexis de Toqueville with predicting, as
early as the 1830s, that the America and Russia were destined
one day each to control half the world.
However, DePorte
argues that De Toqueville only predicted the result (American
and Russian ascendency).
It remains DePorte's theme that it
was German power, not American or Russian, that caused the end
of the European system.
Ibid., p. 9.
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interests of all the parties that had the power to alter the
system.4
What can be said, then, of DePorte's thesis given that
the Cold War division of Europe came to an end, thereby
confounding his prediction?

One side of the bipolar a r 

rangement unilaterally abandoned the most recognizable
aspects of the system only three years after DePorte con
firmed his earlier analysis!

One can begin by saying that

in most ways DePorte was right; the bipolar division of
Europe was remarkably stable.

The first half of the 20th

century saw two tremendous general European wars that spread
to various theaters around the world, but the division of
Europe into opposing blocs in 1948 lasted forty years
without an inch of territory passing from one to the other.
For forty years the Cold War featured arms races, threats,
ideological animosity,

continuance of superpower rivalry

into non-European spheres,

every conceivable effort by one

side to gain advantage over the other,

and the constant fear

of thermonuclear war, but the result was a remarkably stable
system.

At the base of each side's warlike efforts through

out the previous forty years had been the sure knowledge
that if either side let down its defenses for even a moment,
the other side would instantly realize its much ballyhooed
imperialistic designs.

Despite this, the bipolar system

ended unilaterally and with superpower cooperation.

4Ibid., p. x-xii.

The
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actual events showed how far the protagonists had come to
value stablity and the mutual recognition of a division that
guaranteed peace.

DePorte's prediction was far less unimag

inable and fantastic than the actual events of the past five
years.
The bipolar distribution of power ended,

suprisingly,

but we can still ask if DePorte was correct to argue that
the classical balance of power system failed because it
could not contain German power and that the bipolar division
of Europe was more stable because it could contain German
power?

DePorte did not really address the issues of

multipolarity or bipolarity as abstract or general concepts
but discussed only what actually had occurred in Europe over
the previous sixty years.

However, the question of the

superiority of either the bipolar or multipolar arrangement
at reducing the outbreak of war has been discussed intermit
tently by others during the Cold War period without an
agreed conclusion.

Michael Haas,

for example, undertook an

"empirical" examination of multipolar,

bipolar and unipolar

systems which tested them for longevity,

frequency of

outbreak of war, and intensity of war.

He found that

unipolar systems were the most pacific,

but were almost

obsolete.

He found wars to break out less frequently in

bipolar systems,

but to last longer.

Multipolar systems
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were said to sport the more frequent wars,

involving more

violence and more countries than bipolar systems.5
Jack Levy conducted a similar examination fifteen years
later and also found that the data showed bipolarity to be
more stable than multipolarity.

Using his improved set of

examples, however, he found unipolar systems to be the least
stable.6

Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer,

on the other

hand, provided a logical explanation for why bipolarity
could be presumed to be less likely than multipolarity to
lead to stability:
In such a mobile multipolar world, no government
needs to fear a moderate decline in national power
as potentially disastrous.
It can survive as a
second-class power as safely or precariously as it
did as a first class one, provided only that it
joins in time the appropriate new alliance or
alignment.
Arms increases by a rival power, which
in a bipolar world might pose a fatal threat,
might call in a multipolar world for little more
than a quick adjustment of alliances.7
For a system to be stable, according to their hypothesis,
Deutsch and Singer required only that it retain its essen
tial characteristics:
dominant,

that it allow no state to become

that it allow most members of the system to

5Michael Haas, "International Subsystems:
Stability and
Polarity," American Political Science R e v i e w . Volume 64, 1970,
p. 121.
6Jack S. Levy, "The Polarity of the System and Inter
national Stability: An Empirical Analysis," Polarity and War:
The
Changing
Structure
of
International
C o n f l i c t . Ned
Sabrosky, ed. (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1985), p. 58.
7Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power
Systems and International Stability," World P o l i t i c s . Volume
16, 1964, p. 403.
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survive over the life of the system,

and that it allow no

large scale war to break out.8
"The balance of power has been transformed from a
multipolar into a bipolar one," lamented Hans J. Morgenthau
in 1967, a fan of the classical, multipolar system.

"As a

result, the flexibility of the balance of power, and, with
it, its restraining influence upon the power aspirations of
the m ain protagonists on the international scene have
disappeared."9

Morgenthau noted,

"This reduction in the

number of nations that are able to play a major role in
international politics has had a deteriorating effect on the
operation of the balance of power."10
One aspect of the classical system Morgenthau felt was
missing from the new system was that of the "balancer," a
role frequently ascribed to Great Britain in continental
European affairs during the 18th and 19th centuries.

Even

Europe could not play this role between the United States
and the Soviet Union in the period after 1945 because it was
at once both the battlefield and the prize of victory.
"They [European states] are permanently interested in the
victory of one or the other side."11

8I b i d . , p. 390.
’Hans J.
Morgenthau,
Politics Among Nations;
The
Struggle for Power and Peace (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf,
1967), p. 336.
10Ibid. , p. 334.

nIbid., p. 340.

8
One benefit Morgenthau saw in multipolarity was its
complexity,

and the obstacle it presented to any one state

mastering a given situation.

He wrote,

"The greater the

number of active players, the greater the number of possible
combinations and the greater also the uncertainty as to the
combinations that will actually oppose each other and as to
the role individual players will actually perform in
them."12

But this uncertainty,

cited by Morgenthau as being

helpful, was noted by Richard Rosecrance as making foreign
policy more difficult,

and outcomes less predictable:

Multipolarity, then, raises the difficulty of
policy-making.
Results may be altogether unfore
seen; choice becomes very complex.
Since m u l t i 
polarity raises incalculability, the system finds
it more difficult to achieve stable results.
War
may occur, not through a failure of will, but
through a failure of comprehension.13
While Haas and Levy purported to show the relative
stability of bipolar systems empirically,

Kenneth Waltz

actually sought to explain this phenomenon.

Like DePorte,

Waltz*s admiration for the bipolar system was based primari
ly on the unchanging distribution of power in Europe during
the postwar period.

He proffered several reasons why this

system might lead to more stability than the classical
multipolar system.

One reason was the presence of a clearly

superior power within each alliance system.

"As Machiavelli

12Ibid. , p. 335.
13R. N. Rosecrance, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity and the
Future," Journal of Conflict R e s o l u t i o n . Volume 10, 1966, p.
320.
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and Bismarck well knew, an alliance system requires an
alliance leader; and leadership can most easily be maintained where the leader is superior in power."14
superpowers, Waltz wrote,

With two

there were no peripheries;

bipolar division was capable of transforming almost every
conflict worldwide.

Waltz also believed that competition

expanded in such a system to include non-military factors;
the economy became an important indicator of ability to
sustain power,

as was domestic support.

There was an u n 

willingness to accept even small territorial losses to the
other side.

The constant presence of pressure to guard

against any gain of advantage by potential opponents, d e 
scribed by Waltz as inherent in a bipolar system, was,
contrarily,

lauded by Morgenthau as a trait in a multipolar

balance of power.

According to Waltz, threats were worth

turning into crises if they served to prevent war later.
"Admittedly,

cases also occur in a multipolar world,

dangers are diffused,

but the

responsibilities unclear and the

definition of vital interests easily obscured."15
If Waltz is correct, therefore,

the remarkable stabili

ty of the division of Europe from 1949 until 1989 therefore
may have had dimension other than that recognized by
DePorte.

Rather than just being a fortuitous period during

l4Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World,"
Daedalus, Volume 93, 1964, p. 881.

15Ibid. , p. 884.
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which Germany was divided between two superpowers,

it may

have been an era when the whole world enjoyed the relative
benefits of bipolarity.
According to DePorte, the main problem facing the
multi-polar European balance of power after 1871 was the
presence of uncontainable German power.

If this,

and not

the multipolar distribution of power itself, was the main
threat to relative peace and stability,

then it is surpris

ing in retrospect that such a system could have been allowed
to collapse in 1989 without more effort being made to
contain what had been the system*s primary threat all along.
However,

the lesson of the Cold War might be,

instead,

that

a bipolar system is better able to hold in check opposing
forces than is the classical multipolar balance of power.
One way to test this proposition is to review the role
which German-Soviet relations played in two periods of
recent history,
multipolar,

one in which the balance of power was

and on in which it was bipolar.

Relations

between the Soviet Union and Germany during the entire
Soviet period resulted in several episodes that had implica
tions for the whole continent and the international system.
Each of these episodes was approached by the Soviet and
German statesmen with more than the minimal amounts of
national ambition,

creativity,

sense of state survival.

flexibility and a healthy

Yet how these episodes played out

is strikingly different across systems,

and the sum of them
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lends credence to those who argue that bipolar systems are
more stable than multipolar ones.

Three of the most impor

tant episodes during the period before the Second World War,
when the state system was multipolar,

demonstrated the

inability of the system to maintain the status quo.
versely,

three episodes during the Cold War,

Con

initiated for

the purpose of undermining the position of the other side of
the bipolar split,

instead led to a more abiding dedication

to that split and its agreed parameters.
Morgenthau cited uncertainty as a restraining influence
characteristic of a multipolar system.

Rosecrance found

this uncertainty led to unintended consequences.

Waltz said

that in crises under such circumstances dangers appear
diffused,
obscured.

responsibilities unclear,

and vital interests

The course of negotiation, posturing,

decision

making and risk-calculation surrounding the decision of
Germany and the Soviet Union to cooperate at three crucial
points from the end of the First World War to the beginning
of the Second reveals the characteristics of multipolarity.
The examples were the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Rapallo
and the Molotov-von Rippentrop Pact.

The results were the

unintended consequences cited by Rosecrance and the obscured
vital interests cited by Waltz.
Waltz similarly delineated the characteristics of a
bipolar system.

Lesser powers would be led unavoidably to

follow of the leader of their respective alliance.

There
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would be no real peripheries;

every venue could be an

opportunity for bipolar conflict.

The levels of competition

would increase to include regime legitimacy and economic
performance.

There would be an unwillingness to accept even

small territorial losses,
threats turn into crises.
characterized German

and the tendency would be to allow
These factors cited by Waltz,

(both East and West)

and Soviet actions

during the Cold War in response to attempts to alter the
status quo.

They are found in the reactions to the Stalin

Note of Mach 10, 1952, the Second Berlin Crisis,
B r a n d t 1s O s t p o 1it i k .

and Willy

PART ONE
THE INTERWAR PERIOD
There were no two countries on the European continent
with more reason to fear and distrust each other on ideolog
ical grounds during the interwar period than Germany and
Soviet Russia.

Germany during this period was led by

military and industrial elites, under aristocratic,
bourgeois-republican,
guises.

then

and finally, mass-movement fascist

Tsarist Russia fell into the hands of the Bolshe

viks who nationalized Russia's industry, politicized a
rebuilt military,
tional,

and proclaimed the coming of an interna

anti-imperialist revolution of the proletariat.

Despite the rather severe incompatibility between the
world views and ultimate objectives of the leaders of these
two countries,

the dictates of realpolitik necessitated that

at key junctures from the latter days of the First World War
to the opening salvos of the Second, German and Soviet
leaders put aside ideological animosity and struck deals
with each other to the disadvantage of the leading Western
European pow e r s — Britain and France.

These examples of

cooperation had very serious consequences for the m ulti
polar balance of power.

13
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Of these arrangements, those embodied in the Treaty of
Brest-Litovsk,

the Rapallo Treaty,

and the Molotov-von

Rippentrop Pact signalled the greatest threats to interna
tional stability.

CHAPTER I
BREST-LITOVSK
Before the First World War had concluded its third
year, Tsarist Russia's internal political structure col
lapsed and the three-hundred year reign of the Romanov
dynasty came to an abrupt end.
the few popular,
possessed,

Relying on the continuity of

non-aristocratic structures the Empire

a provisional government was formed from the

ranks of the Duma in March 1917, and the new government
tried to pursue the war against the Central Powers to a
victorious conclusion.
V.I. Lenin returned from his Swiss exile in April.
Upon arrival in Petrograd he called for the overthrow of the
Provisional Government and the granting of all power to the
workers'

soviets, where the power of the Bolsheviks was

greatest.

With the army in full retreat in the face of

German advances along the entire front, the Bolsheviks saw
their opportunity in October and seized control of the
government.

They promised the war-weary population that a

Bolshevik coup would result in further workers'
abroad and a just, painless peace.
"The principal significance

revolts

According to Kennan,

(of the coup) was seen by its

authors to lie in its quality as a prelude to that collapse

15
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of all European imperialism in which they were primarily
interested.1,16

But the revolution in Petrograd and Moscow

did not immediately result in workers* revolts in the
capitals of the other warring parties.

This made the

position of the fledgling Bolshevik regime extremely diffi
cult.

Having promised the populace peace in exchange for

power, the Bolsheviks risked going the way of the provision
al government if they too tried to keep Russia in the
disastrous conflict.

But worse than that,

staying in the

war was not only not a viable political option,
longer even a military one.

it was no

The disintegration of the

Russian Army had been deliberately encouraged and pursued by
the Bolsheviks as part of their strategy for gaining p o w 
er , 17 for it demonstrated at once the hopelessness of the
counterrevolutionary cause and the power the masses could
wield by refusing to obey orders.

It also destroyed the

most potent weapon the government might have used against
the Bolshevik insurgency.

But the price to be p a i d — inher

iting a nation almost completely undefended against a
powerful invader— was onerous.

The Bolsheviks had no choice

but to sue for peace and hope for the best.
The Germans immediately sensed that Russia*s necessary
withdrawal from the war could not have come at a better time

16George F. Kennan, Soviet Foreign Policy.
1917-1941
(Princeton:
D. Van Nostrand Company, 1960), p. 12.

17Ibid.

17
for them.

Army Commander Erich Ludendorff had already

decided to seek the conclusion of the war on the Western
Front before American troops could arrive on the battle
fields in great numbers.

To accomplish this, he wished to

transfer most of the German Army in Russia to the Western
Front.18

Besides augmenting the forces in the west required

to balance the recent addition of America to the Western
Allies, Germany also needed a quick conclusion to the war in
order to meet the needs of its malnourished, war-weary
population.

Not only would the Russian withdrawal bring

victory nearer in the military sense, but the prospect of
foodstuffs coming from the Russian steppes brought hope that
the German population would receive the sustenance necessary
for the final push.

For this reason,

as well as the desire

to contain Bolshevism and promote Germany's imperial d e 
signs, Germany also sought the "liberation" of some of the
Russian Empire's non-Russian provinces.
So while the Soviet government called on all the
warring countries to conclude a general armistice,

German

Chancellor Hertling spoke to the Reichstag on November 28,
1917, of Germany's intention to safeguard the "right to
self-determination" for the peoples of Poland,

Courland and

Lithuania.

this declara

Couched in almost Wilsonian terms,

tion was a tactical maneuver to detach these areas from

l8Winfried Baumgart, Deutsche Ostpolitk 1918: Von BrestLitowsk bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges
(Vienna:
R.
Oldenbourg Verlag, 1966), p. 14.

18
Russia and attach them to Germany.

Poland had already been

recognized by decrees of the Kaiser on November 5, 1 9 1 6 , and
Lithuania and Courland were more or less under German
control by the fall of 1917.19
The Soviet government had no choice but to negotiate.
According to historian Wheeler-Bennett:

"The whim of

history willed that the representatives of the most revolu
tionary regime ever known should sit at the same diplomatic
table with representatives of the most reactionary military
caste among all ruling classes."20

The stage was set for a

series of negotiations which carried enormous risks for the
involved parties, more so for the Bolsheviks,
mutual advantage.

but promised

The lure of the immediate advantage

promised was great enough to transcend considerations of
ideology and long-term objectives.
The negotiations proceeded in four phases, with the
Soviet position becoming more desperate at each stage.21

In

late December 1917 an armistice was signed and the two sides
began to discuss the terms of a peace treaty.

Hoping still

that propaganda from the conference table would spark
revolution in Germany and Western Europe,

the Bolsheviks

brashly proposed a general peace with no annexations,

19Ibid. , p.

no

15.

20Richard F. Rosser, An Introduction to Soviet Foreign
Policy
(Englewood Cliff, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, I n c . ,
1969) p. 96.
21Ibid. , p. 97.
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indemnities,

and self-determination of peoples.

The Germans

announced that they would agree if the Allies would also
agree, which they would not.

Then the Germans explained

that the former tsarist provinces were exercising selfdetermination by choosing independence with the status of
German protectorates.22
At this point the Bolsheviks began to appreciate how
fraught with dangers was the option they had no choice but
to pu r s u e — negotiated peace with the Germans.

Continuing

the armed conflict was neither a political nor military
possibility,

but the peace with Germany might be so u n a c 

ceptable to the Bolsheviks politically that its acceptance
could lead to their overthrow.

The Bolsheviks could not be

spared this danger unless the peace were to become a general
one, embracing all the parties, or a revolution were to
occur in Germany to redirect that country's foreign and
military policies radically.23

Although these occurrences

w ere not quite at hand, the Bolsheviks believed them to be
imminent.

Therefore, having signed an armistice with the

Germans which ended their advance into Russia,

the Bolshe

viks now saw their interest in delaying a peace treaty and
waiting for historical forces to rescue them.
To pursue this policy of intentional delay,

the Bolshe

viks sent Leon Trotsky to lead the Soviet negotiators at

22Ibid. , p. 97.
^Kennan, p. 12.

20
Brest-Litovsk.

This phase began on January 9, 1918.

Trotsky began his filibuster with revolutionary predictions,
propaganda,

and attempts to draw the German negotiators into

philosophical,

ideological, and legalistic discussions.

The

Germans brought this circus to an end on January 18 when
representatives of the Rada, the governing body of Ukraine's
recently declared independent republic,

arrived.

The

Germans announced that they would negotiate with the Bolshe
viks over a treaty covering the front north of Brest, but
they would negotiate with the Rada over the future of Russia
south of Brest.24

The hollowness of Trotsky's strategy

became readily apparent.

He allowed the delegation to be

recalled to Petrograd for consultations.
Among the Bolsheviks at this point were three factions.
The left faction,

led by Bukharin,

argued that political

costs made peace with the Germans prohibitive.

It would

give a victory to imperialists and mark the Bolsheviks as
traitors to the Russian nation;
question.

it was completely out of the

Bukharin argued for the Bolsheviks to launch a

"revolutionary war" immediately against European imperial
ism.

Fearing the German occupation of Petrograd that would

certainly result from this foolhardy but romantic proposal,
Lenin urged the immediate signing of a peace treaty to give
the new regime "breathing space."

Trotsky,

finding

Bukharin's proposal unrealistic and Lenin's unacceptable,

^Rosser, p. 98.

21
proposed that the Bolsheviks unilaterally declare that they
would neither wage war with the Germans not sign a peace
treaty with them.25

Since it seemed less dangerous than

resuming the war effort, Lenin agreed to back Trotsky's
plan.

On February 8, the Germans signed a separate peace

with the Rada representatives,
Rada out of K iev the same day.

but the Bolsheviks drove the
On February 10, Trotsky

announced that there would be no war and no peace with the
Germans.

At first confused by the meaning of Trotsky's

declaration,

the Germans announced on February 16 that they

would resume their advance in two days.26
Russia's ability to show any organized resistance to
the new German advance along the entire front was as n o nex
istent as Lenin had feared,
announced harsher terms.

and on February 21 the Germans

The Bolsheviks made inquiries as

to what aid they might receive from Britain and France if
they chose to resume the war.

Bukharin strenuously objected

to receiving any help from the imperialist West.
sponded to such concerns,

Lenin r e 

"Please add my vote to those in

favor of receiving food and weapons from the Anglo-French
imperialist robbers."27

On February 23, seven voted with

Lenin in the Bolshevik central committee to sign a treaty

^Ibid.,

pp.

98-99.

26Ibid. , p. 99.
^Adam Ulam,
Policy 1917-1973
p. 68.

Expansion and Coexistence:
Soviet Foreign
(New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc. 1974),
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with the Germans.
fight on.

Four,

Four supported Bukharin's proposal to
including Trotsky,

abstained.28

Talks

resumed on February 27 and treaty was signed March 3.

Under

the terms of the treaty, the Bolsheviks agreed to the
separation from Russia of the Ukraine,
provinces,

Finland,

Poland, the Baltic

and the T r a n s caucusus.

For the most

part, the German Empire was to have decided the relative
level of self-determination of each of these areas.
The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was a short-lived agree
ment.

It was renounced by the Soviets immediately after

Germany signed an armistice on the Western Front on November
11,

1918, but the example it set was profound and the

effects lasting.

This treaty between German military

leaders and Bolshevik revolutionaries might have cost the
Allies victory in the First World War,
damaging than that,

but whilst less

it made the task of creating a stable

world order on the foundations of a multipolar balance of
power after the war much more difficult.
East,

Victory in the

and the near victory in the West that almost occurred

as a result in the summer of 1918, gave life to the conten
tion that the German Army, which had not really suffered
defeat in the field, had been stabbed in the back by coward
ly Social Democrats in Berlin.

This notion played a crucial

role in fanning the flames of German revanchism in the 1920s
and 1930s.

As a result, Germany would pay lip service at

28Rosser, p. 100.
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times to the Versailles Treaty but would never really adhere
to its letter or spirit.
For the West, the Bolsheviks were threatening because
of their treachery; they had destroyed Russia as a fighting
force against Germany and allowed the transfer of German
troop strength to the West.

Moreover,

they had repudiated

tsarist debts and nationalized foreign investments, which
continued to be a major source of friction after the war.
Bolshevism also represented a major ideological threat to
industrialized countries because of its appeal to class
warfare.

For these reasons, the Allies and Associated

Powers sent troops to occupy Russian ports and meddled
extensively in the bloody Russian civil war of 1918-1921.
The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk demonstrated that,

absent

American help, Britain and France might deal successfully
with either Germany or Soviet Russia but could not handle
both.

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk frustrated Allied desires

for a friendly Russia without Bolsheviks and for an unambig
uous German defeat.

The lack of solid relations with Russia

made the efforts of Britain and France to contain German
power on a long-term basis extremely difficult.

CHAPTER II
THE RAPALLO TREATY
The Rapallo Treaty of 1922 was one of the most signifi
cant steps in the foreign policies of the Weimar Republic
and Soviet Russia in the interwar period.

It was a response

to the failure of the Great Powers to harmonize their inter
ests, and it represented a major blow to the ultimate
ability of the Entente to contain the revisionist aims of
the Bolsheviks and Germany,

and thus guarantee the peace of

Versailles.
The Rapallo Treaty of 1922 was a by-product of the
Genoa Conference which was convened to deal with the reinte
gration of Russia into international trade and to bring
Germany in as a junior partner in the economic reconstruc
tion of Europe.

The European powers failed to prevent the

Bolsheviks from establishing power but were successful in
their efforts to contain the spread of revolution.

They

sought to take advantage of changes inside the Soviet Union
and the consequent willingness of the Bolsheviks to seek an
accommodation with the capitalist powers for the sake of the
aid, trade,
economy.

and investments necessary to revive the Russian

Germany sought to participate in the general

effort to reinvigorate the world economy and, by demonstrat-
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ing that the reparations burden placed on Germany at V e r 
sailles was inimical to this goal, to achieve a substantial
reduction in that burden.
however,

The Bolsheviks were not willing,

to endanger the political gains of the revolution

by becoming the passive object of European imperialism.

Nor

was Germany willing to help the Entente strengthen its
directing role in the international system unless it could
demonstrate that the increased ability to protect German
interests would be the quid pro quo for cooperation.
The Genoa Conference had its immediate origins in the
Brussels Conference of October 6-8,
twenty-one nations,

1921, at which

including Germany but excluding Russia,

met to discuss the Soviet request for famine relief and a
resumption of economic relations with the capitalist world.
The decision made at Brussels and conveyed to the Soviet
leadership expressed a willingness to provide famine relief
to Russia,

but it would be linked to political and economic

obligations:

the Bolsheviks would have to recognize the

debts of tsarist Russia and would have to establish a regime
under which future credits would be secure.29
The reply of Soviet Foreign Minister Chicherin came on
October 28:

Russia would expect substantial aid and invest

ments if it agreed to the terms;

it required a cessation of

intervention against the regime and de jure diplomatic

29Carole Fink, The Genoa Conference:
European Diplomacy.
1921-1922 (Chapel Hill:
The University of North Carolina
Press, 1924), pp. 5-6.
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recognition; and there would have to be an international
conference to mediate the financial claims of the involved
parties.30

This reply was the climax of several important

events in Russia in 1921.

The first was the defeat of the

forces of counterrevolution and the end of foreign interven
tion.

This was followed by a switch from war communism to

the New Economic Policy
government political,

(NEP) and the consolidation of

and financial institutions.

By then

the Soviets had also begun to direct the forces of world
proletarian revolution through the Communist International,
which would have the effect of enabling the Soviet state to
change the role of Communist parties from agents of domestic
revolution to surrogates acting in defense of Soviet Russia.
These developments represented a shift by the Bolshe
viks away from the immediate overthrow of international
capitalism to protecting the Soviet security interests,
first by rebuilding the Russian economy and then preventing
action against the U SSR by a united front of the imperialist
powers.

These changes resulted from an altered Soviet view

of the imminence of world revolution and the success of war
communism as a stop-gap measure.

The earlier optimism about

world revolution was dashed by the failure of the revolu
tionary war in Poland, the fizzling of the expected revolu
tion in Germany,

and the threat posed in the 1921 Kronstadt

uprising when the sailors of the great Russian naval base

^Ibid., p. 6.
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demanded political freedom for all socialist and anarchist
parties.31

By 1921 Russia was interested in reaching an

accommodation with the capitalists in order to obtain the
capital necessary to build the economy,
al recognition for the regime,

to gain internation

and to build relationships

that would allow the Bolsheviks to exploit capitalist
contradictions and play one power off against another.
The Weimar Republic at this time was facing a severe
economic,

and therefore political,

crisis because it was

unable to meet the demanding reparations schedule set by the
conditions of the Treaty of Versailles.

When the Allies,

through the London Ultimatum of May 1921, put pressure on
Germany to step up its efforts to meet its payments,

the

German cabinet resigned rather than comply with the demands.
President Ebert called on Dr. Wirth,

a member of the left-

wing of the Catholic Center Party, a strong nationalist with
the confidence of the German P e o p l e ’s Party,
government.

to form a new

Wirth was an advocate of "Erfullungspolitik,"

or policy of fulfillment, which had as its goal showing
ostentatious compliance with Entente demands in hopes of
undermining the will of the Entente to continue imposing the
reparations.

By demonstrating Germany's good faith and

exposing the crippling effects of reparations,
argued, the Entente could be split.
reasons,

it was

For domestic political

France continued to insist that the reparation

31Ibid.
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demands were too lenient, while Britain,

the United States

and the neutrals found them exorbitant.

Furthermore,

Britain recognized that the demands were inhibiting a
revival of the world economy.

If the Entente could be split

and made unable to agree on policy with regard to Germany,
Germany could hope to escape paying most of the reparations
while avoiding assaults on its territorial integrity.32
There were, therefore,

general trends leading both the

Weimar Republic and Soviet Russia to seek accommodations
with the Entente, but other events showed that neither of
their respective national interests would be secured by
one-sided agreements imposed by the "have" powers against
the "have-nots".

This mutual realization laid the ground

work for a German-Soviet rapprochement at the expense of the
victors of Versailles.
The Soviets feared that they would be faced with a
united front of capitalist nations at Genoa that would force
the Bolsheviks to recognize tsarist debts.

They were even

more fearful of an idea advanced by Germany Foreign M i n i s 
ter, Walter Rathenau,

that the Western powers should estab

lish a joint international consortium for the purpose of
trading with and investing in Soviet Russia.

Such a monopo

ly would eliminate competition among the capitalist powers
for concessions from the Soviets and would turn Soviet
Russia into a semi-colonial object for exploitation by

32Ibid. , p. 15.
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Western capitalists.33

To the Bolsheviks,

the power roost

likely to want to see a major upheaval against the status
quo as laid down in the Treaty of Versailles, was Germany,
which became the obvious target of any concerted Soviet
effort to break the united front of capitalist powers.
According to Gustav Hilger, throughout the efforts during
1921 to establish normal diplomatic relations,

the Soviet

leaders urged the German policy makers to "answer French and
English intransigence and hypocrisy by establishing a
friendship of the two major underprivileged nations."
he said,

But,

in the long run the Bolsheviks* threats were

probably more effective than their cajoling.34
In Pravda,

on December 27, 1921, Bolshevik columnist

Karl Radek hinted broadly that the USSR could always adhere
to the Versailles Treaty and thereby collect reparations
from Germany under the provisions of Article 116, which had
to do w ith the circumstances under which Russia could seek
reparations.
however,

that Soviet Russia would like to avoid this if at

all possible.
1922,

He assured Germans in private conversations,

But an article in Izvestiva on February 5,

stepped up the pressure by hinting that Soviet Russia

held the fate of the German bourgeoisie in its hands.

All

Soviet Russia needed to do, the article said, was join with

33Gustav Hilger and Alfred G. Meyer, The Incompatible
Allies; A Memoir-Historv of German-Soviet Relations 1918-1941
(New York:
The MacMillan Company, 1953), p. 75.

M Ibid.

30
the Entente in implementing Article 116, which could be a
means of sparking proletarian revolution in Germany because
the resulting impoverishment of the Weimar Republic would
intensify class conflict.

The Soviets should not be senti

mental about the fate of the German bourgeoisie,
argued,

it was

because the policies of the Weimar Republic suggest

ed that it was siding with the forces of international
capitalism against Soviet Russia.

Izvestiva added a note to

the bottom of the published article emphasizing that it did
not agree with the view of the author.35
Germany had once before recognized that in some areas
its interests coincided more with the Bolsheviks than with
the Entente when Germany maintained its neutrality in the
Soviet-Polish War of 192 0.

By denying the transfer of

French munitions across Germany to Poland,

it had shown its

unwillingness to assist Entente policies when it perceived
them to be inimical to German or German-Soviet interests.
This policy assisted the development of German-Soviet rela
tions in that it demonstrated the readiness of Germany to
look East when the West was unhelpful;

it enhanced the

S o v i e t 's recognition of the importance of Germany to the
breakup of the united front;

it showed the inability of the

Entente to enact its policies in Eastern Europe over German
objections; and it demonstrated the inability of the Entente
to keep Germany under control.

35Ibid. , p. 76.
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Germany's approach to Soviet Russia did not come about
until the fall of 1921 when Erfullungspolitik was dealt a
severe blow by the West's handling of the plebiscite held by
the League Council on March 20, 1921 to determine whether
Upper Silesia should be part of Germany or Poland.

Although

a great majority had voted for union with Germany over
Poland, the rules of the game were altered by the League
Council after the fact so that Germany could keep much of
the population of Upper Silesia, but Poland was granted much
of the industrial and mining wealth of the region.

There

followed another crisis in the German cabinet in which Wirth
dismissed his anti-Russian Foreign Minister Friedrich Rosen
and recalled the pro-Russian Baron Ago von Maltzen from
Athens, where Rosen had exiled him, to head the Eastern
Department in the Foreign Ministry.36

According to Hilger,

the German press correctly interpreted the changes as
evidence that the government was considering moves toward
establishing relations with Soviet Russia.37
Even the advocates of Ostpolitik38 within the Foreign

36Stephen White, The Origins of Detente:
The Genoa
Conference and Western-Soviet Relations, 1921-1922 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 151.
37Hilger and Meyer, p. 74.
38The term "Ostpolitik," while familiar to most for its
association with Willy Brandt's foreign policy initiatives,
dates at least to the Weimar era. Literally "eastern policy,"
it is usually used to indicate a German foreign policy
orientation seeking Germany's vital interests in the East
through political, economic and cultural initiatives. Konrad
Adenauer, alternatively, was an advocate of "Westpolitik" even
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Ministry hastened to warn against moving too hastily toward
an agreement with Russia that would benefit only the Soviets
by hurting Germany regarding reparations to the Entente.
But, on the other hand, they argued Germany should not
permit itself to be abused by the Entente if it chose
economic collaboration with the Soviets.

And they feared

that after a year of the NEP, the Bolsheviks were anxious to
conclude a trade deal with the capitalist countries and
would not hesitate to use Article 116 if it were a means of
securing such trade.39

As the Genoa conference approached,

Germany began to believe in a worst case scenario in which
the Soviets would acknowledge debts to France,

but insist on

paying for them out of reparations owed to Russia by Germany
under Article 116.
En route to Genoa,

Soviet Foreign Minister Georgii

Vasil'evich Chicherin stopped in Berlin.

His purpose was to

try to convince Germany to sign an agreement renouncing any
outstanding debts and establishing diplomatic relations.
France had given the Germans an inducement to accept the
Soviet offer by publicly floating the idea that if the
Bolsheviks were to accept responsibility for Tsarist debts,

in the Weimar era.
In the table of contents of Deutsche
Aussenoolitik in der Ara der Weimarer Reoublik by Ludwig
Zimmermann, published by the Musterschmidt-Verlag of Gottingen
in 1958, a corresponding chapter subheading is called "Der
Rapallovertrag
und
die
Grundprobleme
der
deutschen
Ostpolitik."
A later chapter is entitled, "Ostpolitik nach
L o c a r n o ."

39Ibid. , p. 77.
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France would support Russia's application under Article 116
of the Treaty of Versailles to receive reparations from
Germany.

Fortunately for the Germans, the Bolsheviks had no

interest in accepting the Tsar's debts,
incentive,

no matter the

but in Berlin before the conference they let the

Germans believe that they were on the point of signing an
agreement with France.
Notwithstanding this pressure from the Soviets, Germany
hesitated.

It feared that signing a separate agreement with

the Soviets might spark Allied anger and retribution just as
Erfuellungspolitik might be paying dividends.

Even though

France had already foreclosed the discussion of the repara
tions,

the British might still reopen the question to

Germany's advantage, particularly if Germany proved useful
in negotiating with the Soviets as part of a united capital
ist front.

Regardless of last-minute illusions of what the

conference in Genoa might hold for a desperate German
Republic,

one scholar of Chicherin's career has noted:

George Vasil'evich did not travel to Italy with
nothing to show for his efforts.
The talks in
Berlin demonstrated how close the two governments
were to an agreement, as they had developed a
draft treaty that could be used at the Genoa
conference.
And the Germans had consented to
maintain close contact with the Soviets at Gen-

^ i m o t h y Edward O'Connor, Diplomacy and Revolution: G.V.
Chicherin and Soviet Foreign Affairs. 1918-1930
(Iowa State
University Press, 1988), p. 88.
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The first week of the Genoa conference, April 10 to 14,
quickly resulted in an impasse.

In response to the demands

for recognition of tsarist debts, Chicherin presented a
counterclaim for damages to Russia caused by the Entente
intervention whi c h prolonged the Civil War.

The figure

Chicherin presented to the Entente far exceeded the value of
the investments they wished to recoup.
Germany had little success getting any of the powers to
discuss the reparations issue.

Indeed,

the German delegates

felt entirely left out of the discussions and were excluded
from some of the semi-official conversations between the
Soviets and the Entente.

They began to fear a deal being

struck at Germany's expense.
Over the weekend,

the German delegates were invited to

the Hotel Imperial near Rapallo, where the Soviet delegation
was staying,

to discuss the treaty which had nearly been

signed in Berlin.

After some minor revisions,

it was signed

on Easter Sunday, April 16, 1922.
In the Treaty of Rapallo, both Germany and Russia
renounced any claims against the other relating to r e para
tions from the war.
Article 116.

Second,

This effectively removed the threat of
Germany waived its claims to credits

extended to the tsarist government and recognized the
nationalization of the property of German citizens,

although

it retained the right to review these claims should Russia
satisfy the claims of other powers.

Not only did this
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establish a break in the capitalists' united front regarding
the Soviet's past debts,

it also made it unlikely that the

Soviets would recognize such claims by other powers.

Third,

the treaty established diplomatic relations between the
Weimar Republic and the Soviet regime,

and Germany promised

that German contact with Russian counterrevolutionary White
missions in Berlin would cease.

Fourth, the treaty set up

most-favored nation trading status between Weimar Germany
and Bolshevik Russia.

And last, the German government

pledged to promote trade and investments actively in Soviet
Russia.
The press conference on Monday morning, August 17, an
nouncing the weekend's developments had a devastating effect
on the Genoa conference.

Although Lloyd George, the British

P . M . , had long before predicted that harshness toward
Germany would lead it to seek friendship from Bolshevik
Russia,

such warnings had been dismissed by Clemenceau as an

attempt to placate Germany at France's expense.41

Now that

the treaty had been signed, France declared it to be in
violation of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles and
illegal under international law.

Others felt that Germany's

action violated the spirit of international cooperation,

and

particularly the spirit in which Germany had been included
at Genoa.

Although under pressure to disavow the treaty,

Germany defended it as a step toward international reconcil-

41Ibid.
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iation and expressed its willingness to place the treaty
within the framework of any general international agreement
worked out at Genoa.

In the event, however,

Germany was

excluded from the rest of the conference.
One of the charges against the Russo-German treaty at
Genoa was that it contained secret military clauses, which
both Germany and Russia vigorously denied.

No such secret

written understanding between the Weimar Republic and Soviet
Russia regarding military matters has ever been traced, but
the signing of the treaty did help the German military to
reach a full understanding with the Bolsheviks on the basis
of negotiations

(independent of the Weimar government)

had been going on since at least 1921.

that

This military

relationship provided the Reichswehr with bases in Soviet
Russia where it could try out advanced techniques and
weapons prohibited at Versailles.

Second,

arms factories

were established by the German military from which half the
output went to the Red Army, and there was an exchange of
technical military plans and instructors between the
Reichswehr and the Red Army.

Because of this clandestine

relationship between the German and Soviet military estab
lishments,

Germany was able to revive its military strength

and circumvent the Versailles restrictions while the Soviets
gained access to a sophisticated armaments industry.42

42Ulam, p. 152.
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The short-term results of Rapallo were more important
for their political and military than their economic impli
cations.

Although Soviet trade with Germany increased

steadily,

it never reached the volumes of the prewar years.

Germany's inability to pay reparations led French and
Belgian troops to occupy the Ruhr in 192 3, but Germany had
sent a signal to the Entente at Rapallo that it had other
options than just buckling under to Western pressure.
During Streseman's leadership of the Weimar Republic in the
mid-1920s,
Allies,

the reparations were made more manageable by the

the German economy recovered for a while.

signed the Locarno Treaty,
Nations.

Germany

and it joined the League of

While developing secure relations with the En

tente, however, Germany also continued to turn eastward,
cultivating trade and military relationships with the Soviet
regime.
The German Ambassador in Moscow,

Count Ulrich von

Brockdorff-Rantzau used the terms "spirit of Rapallo" and
"community of fate" to describe German-Soviet relations
after 1922.

He shared Chicherin's view that as vanquished

nations the two countries had to cooperate to prevent
political domination by the victors of the war.43
The Soviets were considered the major victors for their
ability to hold their own diplomatically.

The deal with

Germany provided the basis for trade agreements and official

430'Connor, p. 95.
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diplomatic recognition from other European countries,
relations continued to be shaky.

though

Adam Ulam wrote that the

Treaty of Rapallo was "the most important formal step in
Soviet policy between Brest-Litovsk and the MolotovRippentrop Agreement of 1939.,|44
Rapallo was the first step toward overturning the order
set up at Versailles.

The treaty broke the diplomatic and

economic isolation with which Bolshevism had been faced,
making it possible for Soviet Russia to deal with capitalist
countries separately,
one another.

and to try to play them off against

More importantly,

it facilitated a Soviet

relationship with Weimar Germany that allowed Germany to
rebuild its military strength and escape some of the r e 
strictions of the Versailles settlement.

The obvious

ultimate object of this alliance was to weaken Poland, which
was France's principal instrument for containing both
Germany and Soviet Russia.
Bolshevism was the mortal enemy of both Imperial and
Nazi Germany and posed the greatest internal threat to the
Weimar Republic almost until its collapse, yet both Germany
and Soviet Russia found that their opposition to the Europe
an status quo allowed them to risk working together.
Because the system was multipolar,

Germany and Soviet Russia

could not be stopped from playing a part in the balance of
power.

There was considerable uncertainty on the part of

"Ibid., p. 149.
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Germany at Genoa as to what Britain and France would allow.
And because both Germany and Soviet Russia wished to in
crease power relative to the others,

Britain and France were

unable to clearly identify which would ultimately be the
greater threat.

CHAPTER III
THE MOLOTOV-VON RIPPENTROP PACT
The final and most famous example of German-Soviet
cooperation,

leading to devastating consequences for much of

the world, was the agreement to divide Poland and establish
"spheres of influence" in the rest of eastern Europe.

By

the 1930's both Germany and Soviet Russia had acquired
leaders whose aggressive goals were logical extensions of
the subtler attempts at subterfuge pursued by more moderate
governments during the 1 9 2 0 's.
Communist movement,

For example,

if, for the

reality had dictated that the Bolshevik

regime in Russia be given breathing space,
protection from foreign intervention,

legitimacy,

and a chance to indus

trialize, with foreign help if possible,

then it was reason

able for Stalin to demand that the Communist International
relegate revolution in ‘other countries to the back burner
whenever this was in the interest of Soviet foreign policy.
And if "socialism in one state" was going to be the vehicle
through which capitalism would be vanquished,

then Soviet

Russia was justified in seeking to reestablish control over
previous imperial provinces.

Rather than seek direct

confrontation with imperialist powers,

Stalin sought to

protect the Soviets from involvement in a war while hoping

40
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that the powers to the West would engage in weakening
fratricidal conflict.
S i m i l a r l y , one might sympathize with Germany which,
under the Weimar Republic, had continuously tried to u n der
mine the terms of the Treaty of Versailles and reestablish
itself as a great power with spheres of influence like any
other great power.

And if the right to seek a revision of

the borders to the east had always been a legitimate Weimar
goal,

then it was no less so after the National Socialists

out-maneuvered more traditional conservative elements and
seized control of the state in 1933.
ed,

A.J.P. Taylor conclud

"In principle and doctrine, Hitler was no more wicked

than many other contemporary statesmen.

In wicked acts he

outdid them all."45
The British and French continued to rely on collective
security to forestall the use of war to change international
boundaries, but with modifications.

By the 1930's many in

the west had begun to concede that the peace imposed in 1919
had been altogether too harsh.

Tolerance grew for efforts

by Germany to seek revisions in areas where the rights of
German nationals had been infringed or where Germany might
be denied the usual right to self-defense accorded any other
state.

At the same time, however,

France tried to bolster

its alliances with the objects of Germany's revisionist

45A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the
(London:
Hamish Hamilton, 1961), p. 71.
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claims to the east,

especially Poland,

Rumania and Yugoslavia in 1935.

Czechoslovakia,

With the latter three,

France established a "Little Entente" calling for action
should any party to the pact be attacked.

After Germany

occupied the Rhineland in 1936, France invested in a series
of heavy fortifications on the German frontier as a d efen
sive measure.
Hitler's fears,

as he began the process of revising

Germany's borders to the east, were that Britain and France
would go to war before German armed forces were strong
enough and that the Soviets would be on the Anglo-French
side.

Under no circumstances did he want to fight France,

Britain,

and Soviet Russia at the same time.

Indeed,

on the

occasion of each advance, Hitler gambled that he had mani p u 
lated the situation so that war would not result.
Conversely,

Stalin's greatest fear was that Britain and

France would stay neutral while Germany launched an invasion
to the east.

This fear was heightened after Britain and

France failed to prevent the reoccupation of the Rhineland
and allowed German and Italian intervention to turn the tide
in the Spanish Civil War.

Knowing that all of Hitler's

remaining known desiderata lay to the east,

by the middle of

1936 the Soviet government was already seriously concerned
over the likely failure of collective security.46

^Kennan, p. 91.
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By supporting the Republicans in Spain and by being the
only country offering aid to Czechoslovakia during the
Munich Crisis, albeit under provisos that clearly could not
be met,

Stalin hoped to signal to Britain and France that

there would be Soviet help in containing the Nazi menace.
After Germany had succeeded in changing its borders
with Austria,

Czechoslovakia and Lithuania,

Hitler's atten

tion turned next to Poland, the most formidable neighbor to
the east.

He offered to support Poland's claim to the

Ukraine in exchange for a peaceful cession of Danzig and the
Corridor, which Poland rejected.47

It then became necessary

for Germany to ascertain the reactions of Britain,
and Soviet Russia were Poland to be invaded.

France

Hitler b e 

lieved that the British and French would go to war over
Poland only if they could be guaranteed that the Soviets
would also.

However,

since it was in the Soviets' best

interest for Germany to fight Britain and France without
Russia's involvement,

only a direct attack on Soviet terri

tory could have enlisted Stalin on the side of the Western
Allies,

and this would not be possible until Poland and

Romania were under German control.48
On March 10,

1939,

Stalin gave a famous address before

the XVIIIth Communist Party Congress.

Although read by some

47Ibid. , p. 96.
48James E. McSherry, Stalin, Hitler and Europe. Volume I;
The Origins of World War II 1933-1939 (Cleveland:
The World
Publishing Company, 1968), p. 230.
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to indicate a readiness to strike a deal with Germany, Ulam
interprets the speech as an attempt to draw out the Western
powers,

citing Stalin's usual use of taunts,

false expres

sions of self-confidence,

and mere insinuations of r a p 

prochement with Germany.

"'We don't need you, but you may

need us; if so hurry up'

is the most sensible translation of

what Stalin was saying."49

However brave Stalin made h i m 

self appear, he still had no guarantee that Britain and
France would not stand idly by while Hitler invaded Poland
and then the Soviet Union,

just as they had surrendered when

faced with every previous Nazi demand.

Weakened by Stalin's

purges, the Red Army in 1939 was no match for the Wehrmacht.
Then on March 31, Neville Chamberlain,
Prime Minister,

the British

unilaterally guaranteed that Britain would

intervene if Poland were attacked.

Ulam concluded that this

statement made possible the whole train of events leading up
to the conclusion of a pact between the Nazis and the
Soviets.

"On its face," he wrote,

pledge guaranteed Poland;

in fact,

"the British Government's
its timing and circum

stances provided a guarantee to the U.S.S.R.
Polish state."50

and doomed the

Had the guarantee not been made,

Stalin

had no assurance that Germany's imminent invasion of Poland
would not leave the U.S.S.R. alone as the next victim of
Hitler's agression.

49Ulam, p. 263-4.
50Ibid. , p. 267.

With the guarantee,

Stalin could rest
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assured that once Poland was invaded,

Britain would go to

war, with or without the help of the Soviets.

Chamberlain

might have withheld his guarantee as a means of forcing
Stalin into making a guarantee to Poland a necessary condi
tion of alliance.
Soviets,

During the subsequent months,

through their diplomacy,

the

endeavored to exact

maximum benefits from the European crisis by negotiating
simultaneously both with the West and with Germany.51
At first, the Soviet feigned indifference and antipathy
toward the British guarantee,

but the Germans made no

diplomatic move toward the Soviets.52

Then the Soviets

began negotiations with the West over guarantees to various
eastern European states and on April 28, Hitler renounced
the 1934 Non-Aggression Pact with Poland and the AngloGerman naval treaties.

Stalin replaced Litvinov with

Mo l otov as Soviet Foreign Minister May 3.

This worked as a

gambit to intensify interest by both Germany and the West.53
Supposedly,

Litvinov was the proponent of collective securi

ty and Molotov,

like Stalin, was a realist.

By August 1939, Hitler had decided to conclude a pact
with Stalin,

accepting his foreign minister's assurances

that the announcement of such a pact would cause Britain and

51Louis Fischer, Russia's Road From Peace to War:
Soviet
Foreign Relations 1917-1941 (New York: Harper and Row, 1969),
p. 329.
52Ulam, p. 268-9.
53Ibid. , p. 272.
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France to abandon their commitment to Poland.
continued negotiations with the West,

The Soviets

attempting to deter

mine for certain that war would break out if Germany invaded
Poland.
Each side had a primary and a fall back position.
Stalin*s first choice was to have Germany fight Britain and
France, with the U.S.S.R. neutral; but since it might not be
possible to avoid a German invasion of Russia, he needed to
guarantee that Britain and France would participate in such
a war as Soviet allies.

Hitler desired that the West simply

leave Poland to its fate.
plished,

If this could not be accom

then he needed the neutrality of the Soviets to

avoid a two-front war.

Britain and France hoped that their

guarantee to Poland and a Soviet alliance would dissuade
Hitler from invading Poland.

Failing this, Britain and

France needed the Soviets as allies in a war.54
During August, Hitler was frantic for an agreement,
because the invasion of Poland was scheduled for August 26.
According to one witness of the Russian and German diplomat
ic exchange,

"Once the many counter arguments had been

disposed of both went ahead with surprising enthusiasm.1,55
When Hitler,

on August 21, demanded an audience for his

foreign minister,

von Rippentrop,

Stalin,

not wishing to

push Germany too far, agreed to conclude a pact on

^ I b i d . , pp. 271-2.
55Hilger and Meyer,

p. 288.
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August 23.

Secret protocols outlined the division of Poland

and the Baltic States between German and Soviet spheres.
Germany also recognized a Soviet "interest” in Finland and
parts of Rumania.

By this agreement Germany completed the

revision of its borders to the east while avoiding a twofront war.

The Soviets likewise recovered most of the

imperial provinces lost after World War I and the subsequent
wars and interventions.

The cordon sanitaire meant to

contain Bolshevism from the rest of Europe was completely
removed.
Notwithstanding the new threats to the Soviets and the
Germans that the outbreak of war brought,

the cooperation

exhibited in the Molotov-von Rippentrop Pact provided each
party with the best possible opportunity to revise its place
in the international order.

This cooperation gave Britain

and France the worst possible position from which to defend
the status quo.

Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia were clearly

dangerous enemies of each other on political and ideological
grounds,

as would be borne out by the subsequent German

invasion of the U.S.S.R.

and the later Sovietization of all

of Eastern and Central Europe,

including large parts of

Germany; yet these animosities were laid aside in 1939, as
they were in 1918, and again in 1922.
But the opportunity to cooperate could not be ignored
because both countries had a stake in revising international
order.

With three sides to the maneuvering,

the parties

were unable to predict accurately the consequences of
chances taken.

Because the system was multipolar,

no one

side could completely trust another because of the very real
danger of betrayal.

Estimations of the effect and durabili

ty of cooperation among one's enemies were shaky.

This led

to behavior born of miscalculation that likely would not
have occurred under a more rigid distibution of power.

48

PART TWO
THE COLD WAR PERIOD
From the elimination of Russia as a player during the
First World War until the outbreak of the Second,

interna

tional relations in Europe had a distinctive three-sided
nature,

continuing at crucial moments German nationalist

revisionism and Soviet Russian revolution against AngloFrench attempts to maintain the status quo.

By the begin

ning of the Cold War, the German side had been eliminated
and politics in Europe took on a distinctly two-sided
nature.

The Soviet Union's forces occupied all of Eastern

Europe and much of the heart of the continent,
friendly,

guaranteeing

nonthreatening governments to itself in each of

the occupied lands.

To meet the Soviet threat,

the USA did

not disengage from the other half of the continent.
quickly became,

Germany

through its respective occupied spheres,

a

factor on both sides of the equation.
The Cold War was initially and often characterized by
the worst outward belligerence and distrust, posing,
seemed,

it

a grave threat to the peace and the future of

humanity.

Yet throughout several incidents regarding the

future of Germany,
Soviet Union,

and especially its relations with the

all sides chose the stability of the existing
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order over the uncertainty of another in which either one
side of the other might benefit or a third side might be
created.

Among these incidents were the reactions of the

various parties to the Stalin Note of March 10,
Second Berlin Crisis,

1958-1961,

1952, the

and the series of treaties

resulting from Willy Brandt's "Ostpolitik," 1970-1973.

CHAPTER IV
THE STALIN NOTE
By the time the

Soviet Union's note of March 10,

was issued, proposing a
German reunification,
occupation troops,

1952,

final settlement of the questions of

a peace treaty,

and the withdrawal of

all the involved parties had made commit

ments knowing that their policies would make the division of
Europe into two camps a reality for the coming decades.

The

Second World War was fresh in everyone's mind and the Cold
War was in full swing.

No state was about to make any

concessions likely to undermine its own position of securi
ty.
The Soviet note
negotiations leading
Germany.

of March 10 called for Four-Power
to a peace treaty with a unified

It suggested the creation of an all-German commis

sion composed of delegates representing the two established
German states to write a constitution for a unified Germany.
It also conceded the right of that state to have armed
forces necessary for its defenses,

so long as Germany was

precluded by treaty from entering an alliance directed
against any power which had participated in the war against
it.

In a rather blatant appeal to German nationalists,

the

Soviets called for the restoration of political and civilian
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rights to all former soldiers and former Nazis not currently
serving prison sentences.
This was not the first time a final settlement of
German issues had been proposed.

In April 1946,

the United

States had offered to conclude a Four-Power treaty on
Germany providing for the demilitarization of Germany and
G e r m a n y ’s exclusion from alliances,

but the Soviets refused.

The Americans and British merged their zones in January
1947.

By the end of the year the Soviets were proposing the

withdrawal of all foreign troops, but the Western Powers
reaffirmed the need to maintain the occupation.

The Soviet

Union withdrew from the Allied Control Council, the body in
which all decisions concerning Germany as a whole were made,
on March 28,

1948, protesting Western discussions on G erma

ny.
At the London Conference June 7-20,

1948, the Western

Powers announced plans for establishing self-government in
the three Western zones.

On June 23, the Soviet and East

European Foreign Ministers declared the London Conference to
be in violation of the Potsdam Agreement and called for
Four-Power action to establish an all-German government,
demilitarization,

joint control of the Ruhr,

tion of reparations.

and a continua

Along with these demands,

all traffic

between the Western zones of Berlin and the Western zones of
Germany were cut off by Russia and the Berlin Airlift began.
There was no further serious discussion of a German settle
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ment until 1950.

On the contrary,

in the meantime different

German governments were established in the Soviet and
Western zones.
For the Americans,

the Soviet note of March 10, 1952,

was a particular annoyance.

America had already committed

itself to the rearmament of West Germany within the context
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The Soviet note

was seen as an attempt to undermine the difficult process of
getting Europeans to cooperate and rearm against the USSR.
In the words of Adam Ulam:
Had [the note of March 10] been presented in 1947
or 1948 ...
the West would have eagerly seized
upon it as a basis for negotiations.
But in 1952
it was bound, at least in Washington, to create
consternation and the feeling that the Russians
were "not playing fair."
Here American diplomacy
has finally put together a plan for the defense of
Europe and the construction of a sizable army— in
the process overcoming American neo-isolationism,
British apprehensions, French suspicions, and
German touchiness— only to find the wretched
Russians with yet another beguiling plan, again
hinting obscurely that under certain conditions
they just might throw their East German regime to
the wolves.56
Too many things had happened in the recent past,

from

the American view, to make a deal with the Soviets over
Germany possible.
of 1948-1949,

First of all there was the Berlin Crisis

designed to discourage the Western Allies from

establishing a government in their newly fused zones.

From

June 1948 to May 1949 the Soviets denied the Western allies
road, rail,

or water links to their zones in Berlin,

^Ulam, p. 535.

requir
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ing them to supply the city by airlift.

The Western powers

were most perturbed by their weak military position in
Western Europe, which made a more forceful response to the
blockade unwise.

Also in 1948, the Soviets participated in

a coup d ’ 6tat against the Czechoslovak government,

and the

other "people's democracies" in Eastern Europe were trans
formed into socialist republics.

Then,

in 1949, the Chinese

Communists drove Chiang Kai-Shek and the Kuomintang off the
Chinese mainland.

These developments made American policy

makers extremely reluctant to come to any sort of deal with
the Soviets which might lead to a withdrawal of the American
presence from Germany.

It was the invasion of South Korea

by the forces of the Communist North in 1950 that convinced
the Americans that the West would have to broaden its
available resources for the worldwide containment of Commu
nism; therefore Germany would have to be rearmed and made
part of the West's European forces.
In September 1950, the Western powers ended the state
of war with the Federal Republic of Germany and pledged to
study a means for the "participation the German Federal
Republic in the common defense of Europe."57

What was

required was a revision of the Occupation Statute signed
with West Germany the year before and a means by which
Germany could rearm without France feeling threatened.

But

57Evan Luard, ed. , The Cold War: A Reappraisal (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1964), p. 26.
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America was determined to rearm Germany within the Western
camp even if it meant that the Soviets remained in occupa
tion of their zone and Germany was permanently divided.
France had apprehensions about any sort of German
strength.

It had,

at various times,

demands for severe reparations,

supported Soviet

and the detachment and

internationalization of the Ruhr.

It had favored putting

permanent limits on Germany's industrial output and wanted
the Saar permanently attached to France.
to German rearmament of any kind,

France was opposed

even within the framework

of the European Defense Community in which German soldiers
would be under the direct command of the Western powers.
But France was not calling the shots.

When the British

wanted to revive the German economy to prevent their sector
from becoming a permanent economic drain,

and when America

wanted to rearm Germans to prevent the defense of Germany
from being a permanent drain of military resources,

France

could kick and fuss and protest but had to go along because
it was dependent on American economic aid and needed British
support on the Continent.
France was relieved by the new Soviet proposal because
it gave an excuse to head off immediate proposals for German
rearmament.

But France found the Soviet proposal for

Germany's armed neutrality very disturbing.
Foreign Minister,

Robert Schuman,

told U.S.

The French
Secretary of

State Dean Acheson that even French Communists were embar
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rassed by that aspect of the Soviet proposal.58
the prospect of Germany being rearmed,
divided,

Faced with

either unified or

the French were ultimately going to prefer that

Germany be armed but divided in two opposing camps, m i n i m i z 
ing the potential danger to France,

than united and armed,

but beholden to neither camp.
By 1952, Germany had already become important as an
integral part of the Western economic recovery, Western
unity,

and Western defense.

It was no longer possible to

contemplate a Germany that was not closely tied to the
West.59

The need for economic recovery in Europe had led

the Americans and British to fuse their zones in 1946, to
forget any idea of placing limits on Germany*s industrial
output,

and to introduce currency reform in the Western

sectors of both Germany and Berlin in 1948

(cited by the

Soviets as making the blockade of Berlin n e c e s s a r y ) .
European recovery and concerns about Germany *s independent
development of industrial capacity led to extending the
invitation to West Germany to become an associate member of
the Council of Europe and to Schuman*s plan for a coal and
steel pool in Western Europe in May 1950.
Korea,

In the wake of

it was judged that Europe could never defend itself

against similar Soviet aggression without a German army as

58Robert
McGeehan,
The
German
Rearmament
Question:
American Diplomacy and European Defense After Word War II
(Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1971). p. 199.
59Ibid.
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part of the Western forces, which prompted the Western d e c i 
sion to revise the Occupation Statute and develop the idea
of an integrated European Defense Community.

Agreement on

the principle of the EDC in Lisbon preceded by two weeks the
Soviet note of March 10.
Not only did the note of March 10 not find any real
friends in Western Europe, but despite the overt appeal of
the note to German nationalism,
in Germany either.

it did not find much support

West Germans were extremely reluctant to

sacrifice their sovereignty for unity,

and they had no

guarantees that any unity scheme proposed by the Soviets
would leave them with their independence.
Blockade,

Czechoslovakia,

Soviet intentions,

The Berlin

and Korea aside as evidence of

German democrats were concerned about

developments within the Soviet Zone that boded ill for the
prospect of free elections ever being held there.

The

Social Democrats in the Soviet Zone had been forced into a
merger with the German Communist Party in 1946, resulting in
the formation of the Socialist Unity Party

(SED).

Any hopes

the Soviets had that this new party would be able to compete
eventually in open all-German elections were dashed in the
Berlin city elections of 1946,

in which the Social Democrats

who refused to merge won an overwhelming victory.
Schumacher,

the Social Democrat

favored unity and neutrality,

(SPD)

So while

leader in the West,

no German democrat could have
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anything to do with the SED or a regime controlled by it in
the East.
Even if Soviet troops were withdrawn,

German democrats

did not have any confidence that they would have been able
to operate freely in the Soviet Zone because the SED had
been equipped with a militarized police force that was an
army in all but name.

Indeed,

it served as the basis for

the creation of the East German army in 1956.60

So German

democrats in the West

feared that if the occupation troops

were removed,

would be in a position to

war.

the SED

wage civil

All German efforts to create a unified German state

were therefore out of the question until free elections had
been held in all of Germany,

and this required the partici

pation of the SPD in the Soviet Zone and the removal of the
militarized police force from SED control.
After the Soviet Union responded to the initial Western
plan to rearm Germany

with the Prague proposals

of November

1950, calling for the

creation of an All-German

Constituent

Council with equal numbers of representatives from the
Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic
Republic,

the West Germans responded with the demand for

free elections first,

in all of Germany.

A UN Supervisory

Committee— consisting of representatives from Iceland, the
Netherlands,

Pakistan,

Brazil and Poland— was set up in 1951

to supervise all-German elections,

^DePorte, p. 164.

but the Polish represen-
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tatives withdrew from the effort and the committee was
refused entry into the GDR.61
Although German nationalists criticized Konrad
Adenauer,

leader of the Christian Democrats and Chancellor

of the Federal Republic,

because his entanglement with the

West would make the eventual reunification of Germany a
virtual impossibility,

he was able to reject all Soviet

overtures by refusing to recognize the Oder-Neisse boundary,
which the U SSR had imposed in 1945, as the permanent border
between Germany and Poland.

Instead, Adenauer saw an

alliance with the West as the surest means of regaining
German sovereignty,

albeit only for West Germany.

He

claimed that joining NATO and then dealing with the Russians
from a position of strength would insure Germany's unifica
tion in freedom.
Soviets,

But because this policy antagonized the

the Christian Democrats had to accept that reunifi

cation would not be within the range of possible options
within the foreseeable future.
Finally,

one may question how serious the Soviet Union

itself was about its own proposal.

The Soviets were

prisoners of earlier decisions they had made with regard to
the German question.

The major decision was to have the GDR

sign a treaty with Poland in 1950 recognizing the
Oder-Neisse as the permanent boundary between them.

This

61Donald Warr, "Germany,"
The Cold War:
A Reappraisal.
Evan Luard, ed.
(New York:
Frederick A. Praeger Publishers,
1964), p. 109.
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guaranteed,

on the one hand, that Poland would be dependent

on Soviet support against German revanchism,

but on the

other guaranteed that German revanchism would be directed
against the Soviet Union.

There could have been no

"Rapallos" with the independent,
envisioned in the March 10 note.

armed, unified German state
Furthermore,

the decision

on Oder-Neisse made sure that under competitive circum
stances, which would have to have been guaranteed in any
All-German settlement acceptable to West Germans,

the SED

would have enjoyed no popular support in a unified Germany,
and the Soviets would have had no internal leverage in such
a regime.

So, ultimately,

even had talks progressed in

response to the note, the Soviets would have concluded that
they were better off with a divided Germany in which one
part was in the Western camp and the other permanently
dependent on the Soviet Union for its survival than with a
neutral,

armed Germany seeking to place itself in the

Western camp at the first available opportunity.
The Soviet Union was also a prisoner of earlier d e c i 
sions in the sense that it had already created the SED and
the German Democratic Republic,

and could not undo them

without an enormous loss of credibility,
its Eastern European satellites.

particularly among

This explains,

perhaps,

why the Soviets could never make the one concession that the
West would have demanded before agreeing to any all-German
settlement:

free elections.

The Soviets'

Prague proposal
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in 1950 had called for an equality of the FRG and the GDR.
The West Germans could not possibly agree since it offered
no security that negotiations would break the stalemate.
Once created, the GDR was clearly not something the Soviets
could seriously bargain away.
The effect of the Soviet note of March 10 was to soften
the West to the point that they had to consider further
negotiations with the Soviets seriously,
alter any commitments already made.
the defeat of the EDC proposal,

but it did not

It did play a role in

but the FRG was rearmed

anyway as a sovereign ally in 1954.

The lack of enthusias

tic response to the Soviet note highlighted that freezing
the status quo, rather than undermining it, might provide
the basis for some future detente.
The Soviet note of 1952 itself was the only serious
effort of any kind the Soviets made to try to forestall the
rearming of Germany.

Soon after Stalin died, there was a

workers* uprising in the GDR in June of 1953 that was put
down only with the help of Soviet tanks,

underscoring the

fact that the regime was maintained only by virtue of Soviet
occupation forces.

Two months later, when the Western

Powers proposed a meeting of the Four Powers to discuss the
reunification of Germany and a peace treaty with Austria,

it

led again only to Western demands that an all-German govern
ment be based on free elections and to the Soviet demand
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that a provisional government be set up on the basis of the
existing governments.62
But Anton DePorte points out that despite the open
hostility,

the rearmament of Germany,

and the absence of a

peace treaty, peace and stability were maintained in Europe.
He cites the Austrian Peace Treaty in the spring of 1955,
the Great Power summit conference in Geneva in July,

and the

establishment of diplomatic relations between the FRG and
the USSR in September,

as examples of policies which con

tributed to peace and stability.63

None of this came about

until West Germany had been rearmed and the West Germans had
accepted that rearmament would make reunification a matter
to be dealt with in the distant future.
The aftermath of the Soviet note of March 10 reinforced
for all parties that the Four Power efforts to deal with
Germany had never been a cooperative effort by allies,

but

had always been a struggle of adversaries for the future of
Europe.

It was only after all parties acquiesced in the

freezing of the status quo along its predetermined lines
that all could recognize that the division of Europe was a
stable situation and formed the basis for,
peace,

if not a friendly

at least a relatively non-threatening stalemate.

This was possible because between the superpowers there were

62Luard, p. 28.
63D e P o r t e , p . 164.
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limited alternatives,

and each side had the opportunity to

realistically assess the possibilities and limits.

CHAPTER V
THE SECOND BERLIN CRISIS 1958-1961
The opening salvo in the second Berlin crisis was
lobbed by Khrushchev at a Polish-Soviet Friendship meeting
held in Moscow November 10, 1958.
the GDR, a democratic,
militarist workers'

He said that in creating

peace-loving,

antifascist and anti

state by his account, the Soviet Union

had lived up to its obligations under the Potsdam Agreement.
The West, however,

by allowing fascist and revanchist p a s 

sions to drive the FRG to militarism,
the spirit of Potsdam.

had grossly violated

In Khrushchev's view,

the only thing

the West retained from Potsdam was the occupation of Berlin,
and they only continued this in order to subvert the GDR.
In a note to the United States on November 27,
the Soviets formalized the charges:
violated the Potsdam agreements,

1958,

the Western Powers had

forfeiting their right to

occupy Berlin; they had refused to conclude a peace treaty
with Germany,

or in its absence, with the two German states;

the West had used West Berlin for the purpose of subverting
the GDR.

Therefore,

the USSR demanded that the West must

abandon its occupation regime and West Berlin must become a
"free city"— demilitarized,
powers,

neutral,

guaranteed by the four

and dependent on negotiations with the GDR for
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access rights.

The Soviets proposed that there be no

unilateral changes in Berlin*s status for six months.
It is often argued that the Soviet's demand was not
serious in that they by no means wanted the West to abandon
Berlin at this time.

Rather,

by putting pressure on Berlin

they might force the West to negotiate over Germany.

As

John Mander reasoned:
By eliminating both the Allied and the West German
presence from the city, the Communists would throw
away the lever by which they hope to influence
Germany as a whole.
If they are genuinely con
cerned about German 'militarism* and 'revanchism'
they would surely be reluctant to do this.64
Similarly,

Jack Schick opined:

way of opposing Bonn's polices:
weapons acquisitions;

in 1958 it feared nuclear

in 1948 it opposed resurgence of

German economic power."65

In other words, when the West

instituted monetary reform,
blockading Berlin.

"Berlin crises are Moscow's

the Soviets tried to stop it by

W hen the question of German rearmament

first came up, no Berlin crisis was necessary because the
European Defense Community failed, but Stalin did issue the
note of March 10,
reunification,

1952, holding forth the prospect of

to forestall West German integration into

NATO.
The second Berlin crisis began after Sputnik had shown
that the Soviets had the capability to produce long-range

64John Mander, Berlin:
Hostage for the West
Penguin Books, 1962), p. 72.

65Schick, p. xvi.

(Baltimore

66

missiles.

In response in 1958, the West Germans urged the

Eisenhower Administration to deploy nuclear weapons in West
Germany under the terms of the December 1957 NATO agreement
ensuring American control of warheads.

Moscow stepped up

its campaign to have Central Europe declared a nuclear free
zone and proposed other regional disarmament proposals.
'•The United States listened to Bonn as an ally of course,”
Jack Schick wrote,

"but Khrushchev could always catch the

ear of the President by reheating the crisis and threatening
to blockade the city."66
Walter Ulbricht,
Unity Party

the head of the GDR's ruling Socialist

(SED), was much more anxious than Khrushchev to

see the Western powers vacate West Berlin.

In addition to

the constant outflow of refugees sapping his county's labor
force, West Berlin was embarrassing because many residents
of East Berlin commuted there daily to work,

enjoying the

higher wage rate earned in West German marks.
official East German exchange rate was 1:1,

Although the

in West Berlin

the eastern currency was only worth five to the West German
mark.

But whilst working in the west, workers benefited

from government subsidies in housing and food in the East
Germany socialist economy.

Furthermore,

the presence of

Western occupying forces in the German capital 100 miles
from the GDR-FRG frontier was an embarrassing denial of GDR
state sovereignty.

If the Soviet Union did not,

^Ibid., pp. 8-9.

in the end,
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really want the Western powers to leave the city and deprive
them of easy access to a pressure point, Ulbricht,

caring

less for concerns of superpower balance than for the surviv
al of his regime, did want them out.

On October 27,

1958,

Ulbricht described West Berlin as an island of the Cold War
in the middle of the GDR.67
While the East German regime hoped for a drastic change
in the situation which would end the outflow of refugees and
gain it legitimacy and recognition,

the West Germans under

Chancellor Adenauer strove to preserve conditions under
which the German situation looked temporary.
words,

In other

in order to continue the claim that the West was

actively working to unite Germany in freedom, Adenauer
opposed any action which lent the suggestion that the
division of Germany had become permanent.

Preservation of

the four-power occupation status of the German capital was
an important part of making a long-standing condition look
temporary.

The Soviets' demand that a peace treaty had to

be signed to normalize an abnormal situation only contribut
ed to the appearances Adenauer wanted maintained.
Beginning on August 30,

1960, the GDR instituted a

selective blockade of West German traffic
traffic was excepted)

(Western military

in order to protest a rally of refugee

organizations scheduled in West Berlin.

The GDR broke

67David M. Keithly, Breakthrough in the Ostoolitik:
The
1971 Quadripartite Agreement (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986),
p. 15.
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precedent by issuing the order in the name of the GDR
Minister of the Interior rather than the Mayor of Democratic
(East) Berlin,

for the first time officially treating East

Berlin as a part of the GDR.

The Western commanders p r o 

tested the blockade as a violation of quadripartite status.
The blockade was lifted when the refugee groups departed
September 4.68
On September 8 the GDR announced that FRG citizens
would require special passes to enter East Berlin and that
West Berliners could enter by showing their West Berlin
identity cards but not FRG passports.

When Bonn refused to

let West Berliner's use their ID cards for travel to the
East this amounted to a ban on travel.

Bonn retaliated

on

September 30 by threatening to cancel the interzonal
(FRG—GDR)

trade agreement just concluded and scheduled to go

into effect January 1.

Ulbricht announced on November 7

that goods from West Berlin to the FRG would be subject to
"inspection requirements."

Bonn proposed on December 1 that

trade be renewed in exchange for lifting the travel restric
tions.

GDR officials showed interest in the talks, but not

in the proposed linkage.

On December 18 Ulbricht threatened

to halt a portion of FRG traffic to West Berlin after
January 1 on the grounds that the 1949 New York Agreement
lifting the blockade was dependent on the viability of
interzonal trade.

A compromise was reached December 21

68Schick, p. 130.
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whereby the trade agreement was reinstated in exchange for
the GDR lifting the inspection requirements and pledging
that the travel restrictions would not be permanent.
trade agreement was restored on December 29.
Schick:

The

According to

"Ulbricht successfully compelled Bonn to choose

between access to East Berlin or access to West Berlin.
expected,

As

Bonn chose the latter.69

On June 3-4,

1961, President Kennedy and Khrushchev met

in Vienna where Kennedy tried to convince Khrushchev that
the U.S. was prepared to go to war if the access routes to
Berlin were threatened.

Khrushchev tried to convince

Kennedy that the Soviets were prepared to go to war to
defend GDR sovereignty if the West insisted on remaining in
Berlin after the Soviets signed a peace treaty with Germany.
The Soviets reissued a demand that a peace treaty recogniz
ing the emergence of two German states,
occupation rights in Berlin,

ending Western

and turning West Berlin into a

free city be concluded without delay.
Speaking to the country by television June 15, Khrush
chev said,

"We ask everyone to understand us correctly:

the

conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany cannot be p o s t 
poned any longer,
year."70

a peace settlement must be attained this

He went on to declare that if certain countries

69Ibid. , p.

13 2.

70George D. Embree, e d . , The Soviet Union and the German
Question September 1958-June 1961
(The Hague:
Martinus
N i j h o f f ), p. 318.
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refused to participate in negotiations for a peace treaty
the Soviets would sign one with the two German states.

And

if the FRG would not sign,"we shall sign it with the German
Democratic Republic alone, which has long declared its
desire to conclude a peace treaty and has agreed to the
formation on her territory of a free city of West B e r l i n . ”
He continued,

"There are some in the West who threaten us,

saying that if we sign a peace treaty it will not be r ecog
nized and that even arms will be brought into play to
prevent its implementation."

He claimed that in this case,

as in the case of the West violating GDR sovereignty and
moving to and from West Berlin by land,

sea, or air without

GDR permission after the conclusion of a peace treaty,

the

Soviets would be able defend against such aggressions.71
On the same day Ulbricht held a press conference in
Berlin in which he said that there were no plans to build a
wall between east and west Berlin.

This most likely r e 

flected his hopes that the Soviets would allow him to pursue
his maximum objective,

driving the West from West Berlin.

According to Robert Slusser, while the West Berlin question
and the demand for a peace treaty were seen by Khrushchev as
levers to force the West to acknowledge a shift in the
international balance in favor of the Soviet Union,

for

Ulbricht securing control of West Berlin was an end in
itself— or rather a "cluster of related goals":

71Ibid. , pp. 316 and 318.

elimination
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of the outpouring of workers and the youth,

enhancement of

the GDR's international prestige,

and stabilization of its

political and economic position.

"The international aspects

of the Berlin problem were of secondary interest to
Ulbricht; his eye was fixed on a definite target— absorption
of the Western Sectors of Berlin."72
Ulbricht*s conditions for a free and neutral West
Berlin included:

termination of political asylum to escap

ees from the GDR, elimination of all western spy and "human
trade" organizations that the GDR pretended were responsible
for the mass disappearance of citizens into the Western
Zone, closing of the refugee facilities, Western guarantees
of GDR sovereignty in the overland transit routes and in the
air corridors,

and renunciation of all Western rights in

Eastern Germany.73
For Kennedy there were three guarantees for Berlin that
could not be surrendered:
economic viability.74

security,

free access,

and

On July 25, he addressed the American

public on what had become the Berlin Crisis.

In his speech,

he defined the threat to Berlin as a threat to free men the
world over.

U.S.

interest in Berlin required continued U.S.

72Robert M. Slusser, The Berlin Crisis of 1961:
Soviet
American Relations and the Struggle for Power in the Kremlin.
June-November 1961 (Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1973), p. 9.
73Keithly,

p. 23.

74Mander, p. 74.
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military presence,

access and egress for the U.S. garrison,

and security and vitality for West Berlin.

He requested

congressional authority for the mobilization of selected
military units and he proposed negotiations with the Sovi
ets.75

Kennedy expressed a willingness to get rid of

"irritants” surrounding West Berlin to which the Communists
objected,76

but on the question of continued Western p r e s 

ence Kennedy's words were clear.

"We cannot and will not

permit the Communists to drive us out of Berlin,

either

gradually or by force."77
The speech was clear on the aspects of the status quo
in Berlin on which the West would not give way, but by its
omissions not so clear on the other aspects of the crisis.
Schick noted:

"The Soviets probably didn't know what to

make of Kennedy's speech in which he said nothing about East
Berlin.

They noticed in Vienna that Kennedy seemed more

concerned about the practical aspects of Western access to
West Berlin than about any other issue in the Berlin cri
sis."78

This is because there was considerable concern on

the Western side of the border about the consequences of the
outflow of refugees and the measures to which it would drive
the Communists.

It was feared that if the measures were too

75Schick, p. 149-50.
76Mander,
^Slusser,

p. 78.
p. 82.

78Schick, p. 160.
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harsh,

there would be an uprising in the East and the West

would be in a quandary over the proper response.

Even in

the Federal Republic there were concerns that if too many
people of the GDR came west, they would be replaced with
Poles and Czechs and the region would lose its German
character.
TV,

In the USA on July 3 0 Senator Fulbright said on

"I don't understand why the East Germans don't close

their border because I think they have a right to close
it."79

Similarly The New York Times wrote on August 4:

"There has never been any East-West agreement that would
prevent the Communists from closing the border between East
Germany and East Berlin.

Why they have not done so in the

past is something of a mystery."80
On August 7 Khrushchev made another speech threatening
to sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR and talking
about the horrors and destruction that thermonuclear war
would bring in its wake.

He called West Berlin a "conve

nient loophole to obstruct the GDR as a socialist state" and
vowed the loophole would be closed.81
And so it was.

Shortly after midnight on August 13 the

GDR published a Warsaw Pact declaration,

adopted on August

6, that accused the FRG of using Berlin for subversive
activities and requested the GDR to take measures to secure

79Slusser, p. 94.
80Ibid.
81Schick, p. 159.
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the border with West Berlin.
West the note added:

As a signal to reassure the

"It goes without saying that these

measures must not affect existing provisions for traffic and
control of communication routes between West Berlin and West
G e r m a n y . 1,82
As the announcement was being made,

a legion of heavily

armed East German guards were stringing barbed wire across
the Potsdamer P l a t z .
wall.

This was subsequently replaced with a

The GDR announced new travel restrictions:

East

Germans could cross West Berlin borders only with special
permission

(i.e., not at all); East Berliners would be

reguired to obtain a special permit for crossing to West
Berlin

(i.e.., they could no longer cross); West Berliners

would have to show their identity cards to enter East
Berlin;

"revanchist politicians and agents of West German

militarism" would be barred from East Berlin;

former d eci

sions on control remained valid for West Germans entering
East Berlin

(making the 1960 restrictions p e r m a n e n t ) ; and

non-Germans would be unaffected.83
important one for the GDR,

The measure was an

for it halted the loss of manpow

er, put an end to the embarrassment of East Berliners
working in the West,

and effectively denied the quadripar

tite status of the city.84

82Ibid. , p. 163.
83Ibid.

M Ibid., p. 171.
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The American response was cautious,
moral outrage and political relief.

revealing a mix of

On the day the barri

cades went up, Secretary of State Dean Rusk issued a "State
ment Concerning Travel Restrictions in Berlin," noting,
"Available information indicates that measures taken thus
far are aimed at residents of East Berlin and East Germany
and not at the Allied position in West Berlin or access
t h e r e t o ."

He went o n :

Limitation on travel within Berlin is a violation
of the four-power status Of Berlin and a flagrant
violation of the rights of free circulation
throughout the city.
Restrictions on travel
between East Germany and Berlin are in direct
contravention of the Four-power agreement reached
at Paris on June 20, 1949.
In view of the seriousness of what had transpired, he warned
of the following action:

"These violations of existing

agreements will be the subject of vigorous protest through
appropriate channels."85
It was not yet clear to the Western Powers that the
wall was the only action planned by the Communists and they
preferred to hold retaliatory measures in reserve for when
the other shoe dropped.

Perhaps this was a preliminary to

the signing of a peace treaty by the Soviets with the GDR
and the transfer of Soviet responsibilty for the West Berlin
access routes to the GDR.

It was clear that German access

to East Berlin or East German access to West Berlin were not
issues the Western powers felt they could do much about.

85Slusser, p. 135.

In
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East Berlin on August 25 Ulbricht told a rally that his
regime would not seek to control Allied communications with
West Berlin until a peace treaty had been signed.86
The pressure on the Western powers was effectively
lifted by Khrushchev in his speech opening the Twenty-Second
Communist Party Congress in Moscow October 17,

in which he

backed off his threat to sign a peace treaty before the end
of the year.

"The question of a time limit for the signing

of a German peace treaty will not be so important if the
Western powers show a readiness to settle the German p r o b 
lem.

We shall not in that case insist on signing the peace

treaty before December 31, 1961."87
The Berlin crisis began with a challenge to the agree
ment allowing Britain,

France and the United States to

occupy sectors of the former German capital.

Although the

Soviets claimed that the Western powers had already lost
their rights in Berlin and that the USSR could take u n ilat
eral action,

it never did so act and the West successfully

indicated that forceful action would have resulted from any
violation of the rule allowing Western access to West
Berlin.
However,

the West failed to indicate that there would

be any considerable sanctions for the GDR's challenge to the
quadripartite status of the city and the GDR moved to close

86Ibid. , p. 13 2.
87Ibid. , p. 310.
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the border between West and East Berlin.

Publicly denying

that the GDR had the right to do this while claiming no
authority to stop it, the Western powers tacitly accepted
that the GDR, which was not recognized in the West, had the
right to control its borders and that East Berlin fell
within those borders.

Both sides,

clearly understanding by

the end of the crisis what the other side would allow,
displayed a complete unwillingness to make even minor
territorial concessions.
Clearly shown was that a mutual recognition of the
borders from which neither would surrender an inch was more
important than gaining recognition of any rights that
crossed those borders;

the West gave up access to East

Berlin and the Soviet Bloc gave up threatening the access
from the West to West Berlin.

West Germany desired the

continued access to all of Berlin as a means of demonstrat
ing that the bipolar division was impermanent and the GDR
illegitimate.

The GDR, conversly,

felt that control over

all of Berlin was vital to its hopes of achieving both
domestic and international recognition of state sovereignty.
Neither got their way because of the necessity of following
the leader of their alliance system.

This was an important

moment demonstrating that mutual recognition of the bipolar
division of Europe was a crucial factor in easing tensions
between the two sides.

Allowing the threats to turn into a

crisis and dealing with it as such may have allowed the
situation to stabilize rather than turning into war.
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CHAPTER VI

OSTPOLITIK AND THE TREATY OF AUGUST 12, 1970
The resolution of the second Berlin crisis in favor of
the status quo led to some profound realizations by both
German governments.

The West Germans found that there was

to be no rollback of Communism and thus had to accept that
reunification from the West through strength was not a
realistic short-term goal.

Similarly,

the East Germans

found the Soviets unwilling to remove West Berlin as a
capitalist outpost in the middle of their country,

or even

to make international recognition of the German Democratic
Republic a condition for acknowledging Western access
rights.

But because it caused the West Germans to change

their attitude about the nature of, and remedy for, the
German problem,

the construction of the Wall was to lead to

some major challenges to the East German regime.88
In 1962, West German Foreign Minister Schroeder an
nounced a new "policy of movement"

(Politik der B e w e g u n g ) .

This policy sought to substitute economics for politics and
was aimed at improving ties with states in Eastern Europe,

88N. Edwina Moreton, East Germany and the Warsaw Alliance;
The Politics of Detente (Boulder:
Westview Press, Inc.,
1978), p. 28.
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at East Germany's expense.89

It was hoped that these new

East European trading partners would lose interest in the
hard line politics of Walter Ulbricht.
The new eastern policy,

or "Ostpolitik," beginning to

take shape in the 1960s had several important goals.

One

goal was to improve the image of the Federal Republic and
enhance its international status, not just in Eastern Europe
but also in the Third World.

A second was to pry open the

door to the German Democratic Government and exert a m o d e r 
ating influence in East Germany.

Thirdly,

"Ostpolitik"

aimed to reestablish German influence in both the northern
and southern tiers of East Central Europe and thereby
obliterate as much of the legacy of the Nazi period as
possible.90
An alliance between the Christian Democrats and the
Free Democrats collapsed in 1966 and the CDU and CSU formed
a grand coalition instead with the Social Democrats,

bring

ing the SPD into the government for the first time since the
war.

With Kurt Georg Kiesinger as Chancellor and the SPD's

Willy Brandt as Foreign Minister,
implemented.

the new Ostpolitik was

Previously the FRG selectively refused to

recognize any country that recognized the GDR, a policy
known as the Hallstein Doctrine.

Accepting that Warsaw Pact

89Ibid. , p. 29.
^Andrew Gyorgy, "Ostpolitik and Eastern Europe,"
International Politics of Eastern E u r o p e . Charles Gati,
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), p. 154.
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states faced special circumstances,

the new government

sought to exchange ambassadors with whichever East Central
European states were willing to participate.

As an incen

tive, the new government offered substantial economic aid in
the form of trade and loans.

The West Germans were willing

to offer hard currency at low interest rates and long-term
credit toward industrialization.

This policy resulted in

relations between the FRG and Rumania in 1967 and with
Yugoslavia in 1968.

Czechoslovakia and Hungary were about

to fall into line when the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia
intervened in 1968.91
In 1969, the SPD had the opportunity to lead the
government and let the CDU/CSU go into the opposition.
Brandt became chancellor in alliance with the Free Demo
crats.

He and his foreign minister,

Scheel,

immediately sought to offset the international chill

caused by the Czech invasion.

the FDP's Walter

Brandt felt that the only way

to overcome the division of Germany was to seek accommoda
tion with the existing political realities while trying to
bridge the divide on a human level.

Brandt realized that to

reach all of the accommodations he was seeking,

negotiations

had to be pursued simultaneously on four levels in a fashion
that maintained the linkage between each level.

In late

1969, he began a campaign to reach agreements on each of
these levels; establishing trust first with the Soviet Union

9lIbid. , p. 156.
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to win access to the bloc, then with Poland to allay con
cerns of revanchism,

then working multilaterally to have the

quadripartite status quo of Berlin formalized and stabi
lized,

and finally, dealing with the GDR and the FRG's

proper relationship.

He signaled his serious intent to the

Soviets by signing the nuclear nonproliferation treaty.92
The Soviets were likewise willing to reach accommoda
tions with the West in general and with West Germany in
particular for a number of reasons.

Tacit acceptance of the

status quo during the Berlin crisis met many of the Soviet
security demands.

During the early 1960s Soviet policy

aimed to change West Germany's foreign policy towards the
East as a means of influencing the West by undermining
Western cohesion,
ence.

and thereafter reducing American influ

The Soviets hoped to encourage a greater acceptance

from the West Germans for the division of Germany and the
borders of Poland.

The Soviets also wanted to prevent the

increased West German activity in Eastern Europe from
becoming a disruptive influence, but this policy seemed to
contradict the Soviet desire to increase trade.93
By the late 1960s the Soviets felt that they had
substantially caught up with the West in terms of nuclear
armaments.

Furthermore,

the lack of response to the Soviet

invasion of Czechoslovakia indicated clearly that the Soviet

^ I b i d . , p. 160.
93M o r e t o n , p . 30.
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sphere of control in Eastern Europe would be respected.
Thus,

from the Soviet point of view, there was now a limited

opportunity to seek a way out of their growing technical and
economic difficulties by seeking industrial and technical
cooperation w ith the West without engendering too much
d e p e n d e n c e .94
Since West Germany was clearly not a military or
nuclear threat to the Soviet bloc, the Soviets were able to
seek economic and technical cooperation while hoping to
reduce American influence in Europe and helping to reestab
lish respectability for the French and Italian Communists,
who had a hard time defending the Czech spring.95
With the Brezhnev Doctrine, which enunciated the right
of the Warsaw Pact nations to intervene in member states
militarily to prevent "counterrevolution,” which they had
espoused and enforced through the Czechoslovak crisis,

the

Soviets had clearly indicated to the FRG that any future
accommodations with the West would not be permitted to pose
a threat to their control of their bloc.

This ensured that

relations with the FRG would be less costly than previously
may have been feared.96

^Hansjurgen Schierbaum, Interaerman Relations; Develop
ments . P r o b l e m s . Facts (Munich:
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By 1969, the leaders of the Soviet Poltiburo had
converged on a policy of resuming negotiations with West
Germany.

Party leader Leonid Brezhnev was primarily con

cerned with Soviet economic needs, while ideologist Mikhail
Suslov felt that cooperation with the SPD might help further
the communist cause.

Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin hoped

that economic cooperation might lead to arms control,
likewise, Nikolai Podgorny,

and

also a Politburo member, warned

of the opportunity costs of pursuing the arms race.

Soviet

Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko supported both the economic
relations and arms control,

and saw a link between detente

with West Germany and detente with the United States.97
The minimum Soviet desiderata included a recognition of
the territorial status quo in Eastern Europe and recognition
that economic relations with the West would not alter the
basic structure of the Soviet command economy.
military detente had not yet been decided upon.

Significant
These

conservative parameters seemed to rule out trying to pry
West Germany from NATO.98
The East German leadership had learned entirely differ
ent lessons from the second Berlin Crisis than had the USSR.
One was that a resolution of the crisis which required
severing Western ties to West Berlin was beyond their
control— such a decision remained the purview of the Sovi-

^Ibid., p. 164.
98Ibid.
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ets, and therefore something remained of four-power control,
whether the East Germans would admit it or not.

The other

was that because international recognition of East Germany
was limited,

because of the F R G *s success at promoting the

Hallstein Doctrine,

the GDR had no choice but to deal with

the world through its Warsaw Pact allies."
The West German campaign during the early 1960s to buy
the friendship of these erstwhile friends of the GDR was
therefore doubly troubling because if the East Germans could
not get their allies to insist on FRG recognition of the
German Democratic Republic before signing trade agreements,
then the GDR risked isolation within its own alliance.
Before Brandt's reformulation of the West German approach,
the GDR could at least count on the Soviets to prevent the
West German effort from succeeding.100
The 1960s found the East German regime in much stronger
shape domestically than internationally.

After the Wall

went up, the problem of the constant drain of the workforce
across the border ceased and the leadership began to empha
size the separate development of East Germany.
second in command,

The SED's

Erich Honecker, warned Ulbricht that his

continued insistence that the GDR must be the foundation of
a united Socialist Germany was undercutting the ability of
the GDR to build a separate sense of identity.

"Moreton, p. 37.
100Ibid. , p. 41-2.
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crisis facing the regime,

according to this viewpoint, was

not one of legitimacy,

as seen by the West,

but of its

independent identity.

The economic success of the GDR in

the 1960s made the country stronger internationally, within
its alliance,

and made Ulbricht's leadership bolder.101

Ulbricht was well aware that the GDR was indispensable
to the Warsaw Pact precisely because of its invaluable
contribution to Soviet and East European economic develop
ment.

Any encroachment into the economic relations of

Eastern Europe by West German economic power would incline
East Germany's allies to agreements with the FRG at its
expense.102

Ulbricht also understood that the Czech crisis

was the manifestation of domestic economic discontent.

He

feared that these forces would push the Eastern European
leaders into hasty agreements which might subject them to
economic dependence on the West in general,
particular.

and Bonn in

This would have compromised the political

independence of the Soviet bloc states and given the FRG a
dengerous level of influence.

Ulbricht was therefore the

first to criticize Dubcek and warn that his reforms were
about to go too far.

He tried to rally the Warsaw Pact

behind a program of economic modernization "by our own

101Ibid. , pp. 38-40.
102Sodaro, p. 135.
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means.”

He offered to have the GDR be the first to acceler

ate its own economic development plans.103
When Brandt changed FRG policy to include a willingness
to recognize the territorial status quo and to deal with the
G D R on an equal basis, the Soviets resolved,
tioned reasons,

for aforemen

to undertake negotiations; and when this

occurred in late 1969, the GDR was brought into dialogue
with Bonn very much against its will.104

The situation

shows that the domestic and foreign policy needs of the GDR
and its Warsaw Pact allies were inverted.

While the threat

of detente caused East Germany to step up its economic
program,

the need to step up their economic programs lead

the other East Europeans to seek detente.105
There were five major threats seen by the GDR leaders
as inherent in detente with the West.

First, permitting the

FRG to accept international borders with reservations
concerning the Oder-Neisse line was unacceptably imperma
nent.

Second, having to acknowledge four-power responsibil

ity for Berlin would mean losing the ability to claim full
sovereignty,
Third,

including control over the access routes.

any increase in contact between the East and West

Germany would allow the FRG to manipulate and influence the
Communist bloc,

and possibly cause a decline in the impor

103Ibid. , p. 109.
104Moreton, p. 201.
l05Sodaro, p. 165.
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tance of the GDR within the bloc.

Fourth,

increased con

tacts between the West Germans and the East Germans could
very well undermine domestic support for the SED, which was
built on its comparative achievement within the East but
which could not compare with the achievements of West
Germany.

Fifth, the doctrine of eventual reunification,

surrendered by Brandt,

not

implied that someday the German

Democratic Republic might cease to exist.106

For these rea

sons, the SED rightly suspected that any agreement reached
by the Soviets and West Germany would tend to compromise
away its minimum requirements,

complete physical security of

the East German state and its full, uncompromised participa
tion in international relations.107
But the SED was not going to have a choice over whether
the Soviets negotiated with the West Germans or not.
Because Brandt's approach to the German issues was pragmatic
it enjoyed greater success than his predecessor's policy of
denying the legitimacy of East Germany.

Because detente

involved heretofore unprecendented openness and cooperation
between the blocs,

it had come to require that cohesion be

maintained within each bloc.108

So Ulbricht could not ob

ject outright when the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic
of Germany signed a treaty in Moscow August 12,

106Ibid. , p. 167.
107Moreton, p. 201.
l08Ibid. , p. 107.
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renounced the use of force and established respect for the
inviolability of borders.

The FRG delivered a note to the

Soviets the same day explaining that the Federal Republic of
Germany would continue to seek German unity through free
self-determination.

But the West Germans agreed in the

treaty to establish relations with East Germany based on
equality and non-discrimination in terms of international
recognition,

and respect for independence and autonomy in

matters concerning internal competency within their respec
tive borders.109

Brandt indicated that a four-power a gree

ment on Berlin would be a prerequisite for West German
approval of the treaty.

The Soviets signalled their w i l l 

ingness to consider further concessions by signing the
trea t y . 110

By December,

the West Germans had concluded a

treaty with Poland recognizing that the Oder-Neisse line
constituted the western frontier of Poland and renouncing
the use of force to change borders.
The German Democratic Republic was deeply annoyed by
the FRG-Soviet treaty.

For one thing, the treaty did not

require that the FRG recognize the GDR as a completely
independent,

sovereign,

international law.

and therefore foreign,

country under

For another, Ulbricht could no longer

use the image of a revanchist militarist Federal Republic to
demand bloc solidarity in support of his government.

109Ibid. , p. 150-1.
110Sodaro, p. 2 00.
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Finally,

the treaty not only did not mention Berlin,

but the

Soviets were beginning four-power negotiations in response
to Brandt's insistence on their necessity.111
Berlin was the key to the whole process,

for a recogni

tion of continued four-power control over Berlin implied a
continued four-power responsibility for Germany as a w h ole—
the legal basis for Brandt's insistence that there existed
but one German nation.

Berlin therefore continued to

symbolize the ultimate lack of sovereignty by the GDR over
its whole territory.

Gaining the right to control access to

Berlin was therfore important for the GDR.
the negotiations,

At this point in

the pressure on the GDR between the West

German challenge and the growing momentum of Soviet policy
became acute.112
Ulbricht managed to bring the quadripartite talks to a
stalemate temporarily when he tried to negotiate over
transit to Berlin separately with West Germany,

but the

Soviets were quickly growing tired of his shenanigans, which
verged on a declaration of independence from Soviet foreign
policy.

Soviet irritation helped bring to a head some

conflicts
leadership,

over Ulbricht's economic policies within the SED
leading to his replacement by Erich Honecker as

First Secretary of the SED in the spring of 1971.113

inMoreton,

p. 149.

112Ibid. , p. 204.
113Ibid. , p. 205.

91
Honecker*s first foreign policy speech as the new SED
chief on May 3, 1971,

indicated his party's willingness to

accept whatever compromises over Berlin the Soviet's agreed
to.

He referred to West Berlin as a "city with a special

status" rather than the heretofore insisted upon "indepen
dent political entity."114
The 1971 quadripartite agreement over Berlin recognized
continued four-power responsibility for the city and guaran
teed access from the West.

Although West Germany was

permitted to represent West Berlin in foreign affairs and
maintain a close economic relationship with the city, the
FRG had to agree that the city was not a constituent part of
the Federal Republic and it agreed not to try to hold any
more official gatherings there.
The agreement was a major blow to the German Democratic
Republic on several fronts.

Because civilian traffic was to

be "facilitated" and given "preferential" treatment,
lost the ability to obstruct such traffic,
ing pressure towards a political goal.

the GDR

a means of exert

The recognition of

four-power responsibility meant no sovereignty by the GDR
over the access routes and it bolstered Brandt's argument
that there was still a four-power responsibility for Germany
as a whole.

The inter-German agreement on transit forced

the GDR to negotiate with the FRG over Berlin,

a matter in

which the GDR had always maintained the FRG had no legiti-

114Sodaro, p. 212-3.
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mate interest.

Finally,

the agreement allowed West Berlin

ers to visit East Berlin freely, and not just with special
permission.

After Ulbricht's departure,

the SED leadership had not changed,

the interests of

but its willingness to

openly defy M oscow had changed.115
In 1973,

formal relations between the two German states

were established.

This relationship was not considered by

the FRG to be a relationship with a foreign country,

but

rather a relationship that respected the G D R 1s autonomy in
matters within its borders,

according to Brandt's formula

tion of recognizing two states but only one nation.

The

Federal Republic continued to claim restricted authority
regarding the German nation as a whole in order to maintain
that the German question was still a matter to be resolved
in the future.

Nevertheless,

both states became members of

the United Nations.
While debating approval of the treaties between the FRG
and the Soviet Union and Poland, the four main parties in
the Bundestag

(the SPD, the F D P , the CDU and the CSU) had

reached a consensus on an interpretation that would not let
the approval conflict with the FRG's Basic Law.

This

compromise affirmed that recognizing what constituted
borders in the present did not lay a legal foundation that
might be used to prevent establishing new borders that can
only be established by a treaty of peace.

n5Ibid. , p. 214.

Furthermore, the
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treaties did not negate four-power responsibility for
Germany as a whole or Berlin as whole.
tance,

After some reluc

Soviet Ambassador Valitin Falin informed Scheel that

Moscow would acquiesce in the Bundestag's interpretation.
The Nixon Administration let the CDU know that it would like
to see a yes vote on the treaties— which sent a positive
signal to the Kremlin regarding America's willingness to
intercede with its allies in the interest of detente.

After

pressure from groups of Germans who had been refugees from
the eastern provinces,

CSU leader Franz Josef Strauss backed

out of the compromise,

and the CDU and CSU abstained,

allowing the treaties to pass without their support.116
Nevertheless,

the treaties were seen as victory for Willy

Brandt's "Ostpolitik" initiative in that they were perceived
to have been a step toward overcoming the division of
Germany rather than confirming it.117
The Soviet Union was widely interpreted as having won
because the treaties recognized its hegemony over half of
Europe.

It lost only its questionable right to interfere

with access to Berlin.118

But Brezhnev now chose a less

accommodating path regarding the division of Europe than
might have been possible.

He chose to continue the arms

build-up rather than risk the possible political dangers of

116Ibid. , p. 217.
117Schierbaum, p. 42.
118Ulam, p. 754.

94
disarmament.

He realized that while disarmament might have

helped reduce American influence in Europe,

it might also

have emasculated Soviet control over Eastern Europe because
if West Germany were no longer considered a revanchist
m ilitary threat, the East Bloc nations would grow less
tolerant of Soviet troops stationed in their countries.

The

uncertainties of a less divided Europe were not attractive
compared to the security of a Europe divided between two
counterpoised military and ideological blocs.

The firm

continuance of West Germany in NATO was still an acceptable
reality compared to an FRG with a much more independent,
less predictable,

and

foreign policy.119

On the ideological front, too, the concept of coexis
tence was not incompatible with a strong bipolar rivalry.
While the new rules explicitly renounced the right to
intervene militarily in another country
bloc,

(of an opposing

a n y w a y ) , communists could not ignore that socialism

and capitalism continued to be in constant struggle and that
this struggle would continue to manifest itself in internal
efforts for class liberation.

This process would continue

to be encouraged materially and politically by the socialist
community.

According to Stephan Doernberg, Director of the

GDR Institute for Politics and Economy:
Peaceful coexistence is a category of internation
al relations in a era of worldwide transition from
capitalism to socialism.
It includes the dialec-

119Ibid. , p. 202.
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tical unity
of fight and cooperation on the
various fields of relations with the aim of d i 
recting the conflicts between the socialist and
imperial states rooted in the antagonism of the
two social systems into peaceful channels.
An
ideological coexistence is, however, impossible,
as socialist and bourgeois ideology are irrecon
cilably opposed to one another.
It also is not
and cannot be a guarantee of the status q u o . 120
The cooperation achieved between

the Soviet Union and

the Federal Republic of Germany led more immediately to

an

agreement to renounce the use of force, recognized the
reality of postwar arrangements,
of trade and human contact,
in detente such as SALT,

opened up the East in terms

and led to broader achievements

the end of the war in Vietnam,

and

the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe,
including the Helsinki Final Act.
In more important ways, the treaties did confirm and
strengthen the bipolar division of Europe.

The Soviets were

left with firmer control over their Warsaw Pact allies,

and

this control was tacitly approved by both the West Germans
and the West.

The Soviets also maintained a formidable arms

position and, despite coexistence,

found enough outlets for

superpower rivalry to occupy better than a decade.

West

Germany likewise strengthened the Western position by
obtaining access to the Eastern Bloc while giving the
campaign for reunification on Western terms new life through
a fresh,

innovative and nonthreatening approach.

120Schierbaum, p. 27

This

96
approach remained firmly anchored in the NATO alliance and
never created a third way between the superpowers.

CONCLUSION
During the Interwar Period,

the three examples examined

display many of the hoped-for characteristics of a m u l t i 
polar classical balance of power system,
tantly,

and, more impor

all of the most dreaded characteristics of said

international arrangement.
During the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk,

the Bolshe

viks vacillated between their three alternatives
Germany,

deal with Western powers,

(deal with

or incur the ire of both)

and charted the most opportunistic course allowing survival
of revolution at home and independence of action interna
tionally.

The Germans,

by dealing with the Bolsheviks,

managed to make their subsequent defeat inconclusive at best
because Germany was only defeated on one front.

It also

helped give the Bolshevik regime a better chance of surviv
al, which proved problematic to the West after the war.
Britain and France had the difficult task of trying to
squelch revolution in Russia while trying to convince
Germany that it had indeed lost the war, and should accept
any terms of peace deemed appropriate by the victors.
This three-sided arrangement wreaked havoc with the
Genoa conference and the attempt to reintroduce Russia and
Germany as respectable concert-of-Europe players.
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Soviet
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diplomats successfully played Germany off against Britain
and France, winning for the USSR virtually cost-free
readmission into the family of nations by signing the
Rapallo Treaty.

Germany vacillated between the perceived

opportunity to work as an integral
part of the West,

(though second class)

or take advantage of its first real

opportunity to become again a major independent player.
Britain and France proved unable to keep Germany on board
with a united plan for dealing with Russia.
Finally,

Stalin allowed Hitler to invade Poland while

guaranteeing that Britain and France would go to war over
it, the Soviet Union would be left out

(for two years,

a n y w a y ) , and the Soviets would be able to claim some spoils
from the deal to use as a temporary buffer against the
German attack they knew was to come.

Hitler was able to buy

Soviet neutrality and gave himself the option of avoiding a
two-front war.
Had the balance of power been less multipolar in each
of these three circumstances; had Britain and France the
relative power to make any of these three instances bipolar
instead,

they surely would have done so, regardless of what

some might say about the merits of a multipolar system.

Had

Britain and France been stronger or either Germany or Russia
weaker,

they might have had the chance to send troops to the

Eastern Front to prevent Russia's revolution and its w i t h 
drawal from the war.

They might have been able to hold
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Germany in their camp at Genoa without fear of German
recovery and independence.
aggression earlier.

They might have stopped Hitler's

But they had to deal instead with a

multipolar distribution of power,

and one is reminded of the

observation of Rosecrance on multipolarity:
difficulty of policy-making,

it raises the

because choices become complex

and results unforeseen.
With hindsight,

there seemed to have been no such

problems of excessively complex arrangements of power in the
Cold War Europe of bipolarity.

Before Stalin issued the

note of March 10, 1952, the United States would have gladly
disengaged from Europe after the war,

but the Soviets posed

a threat which the U.S. could not ignore.

France would have

had the Germans never rearm, but France did not have the
choice.

The Soviets would have liked to have had no securi

ty concerns, but the outside world contained too much power.
German democrats would have chosen unity, but there was no
guarantee of elections or sovereignty.
would have likewise chosen unity,

German communists

but there was no assurance

they could win an election.
When Khrushchev threatened the Western presence in
Berlin,

the West was absolutely unwilling to surrender even

an inch of territory.

The crisis seemed to take the world

to the brink of war, but the stakes were clear,

the division

of responsibilities understood and interests defined.

The
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Western Powers were willing, however,

to allow the other

side title to what was effectively already its.
During Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik offensive,

although

the levels of competition deepened to include comparative
domestic support and economic power,

issues of contention no

longer posed any threat to borders or bloc control.

The

Soviet bloc was secure under the Brezhnev Doctrine; Soviet
control was practically
tries.

now sanctioned by the NATO coun

So when the Soviets

position of strength,

decided to pursue detente from a

the East German regime had no choice

but to fall into line, no matter how inimical the policy was
to its own interests.

The bipolar division eliminated most

of the options for most

of the countries,

but the stability

of the system continued

for lack of a serious third force

challenge.
As Waltz observed:
major contenders,

"The constancy of effort of the two

combined with ... their preponderant

power, have made for a remarkable ability to comprehend and
absorb within a bipolar balance the revolutionary political,
military and economic changes that have occurred."121
He noted that the two "losses" of China

(presumably the

first by the United States when the Nationalists fled the
Mainland,

and the second by the Soviet Union when the Sino-

Soviet rift occurred in the late 1950s)

121Waltz, p. 886.

barely affected the
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balance of power between the United States and the Soviet
U nion.122
If bipolarity is such a wonderful thing, what can be
said for a world that no longer enjoys it?

For one thing,

much depends on whether the world becomes multipolar,
unipolar,
returns).

or a new bipolarity emerges

(or the old one

Unipolarity was said by Haas to be more stable

but by Levy to be less.

Rosecrance had another prediction

concerning the loss of bipolarity:
If detente is desirable, it is possible to have
too much of a good thing.
A total bipolar rap
prochement, an end to the Cold War, would be
likely to create a new bilateral tension between
major power and multipower spheres.
In practical
terms it would represent a conflict of rich coun
tries and poor countries ... . This emergent
bipolarity would demand a rapid spread of nuclear
weapons in previously multipolar areas.123
Based on an understanding of the relative merits of
bipolarity and multipolarity,

a wise course of action may be

to attempt to create a more unipolar world order with the
sober expectation that a bipolar world may be an expectable
result and a survivable fallback position.

122Ibid. , p. 887.
123Rosecrance, p. 322.
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